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Law’s Remarkable Failure To Protect 
Mistakenly Overpaid Employees 
  INTRODUCTION   
Mistaken overpayments to employees are everywhere. 
Whether it is the Department of Defense overpaying soldiers 
because of antiquated compensation systems and complicated 
pay structures,1 a university overpaying employees because of 
turmoil created by a natural disaster,2 or a medical center 
overpaying employees because of poor controls over payments,3 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I am 
very thankful for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this Article from Rich-
ard Alderman, Adam Badawi, Peter Linzer, Thomas Kohler, Nathalie Martin, 
Jeff Sovern, Dru Stevenson, and Ronald Turner. For research assistance, I am 
grateful to Olivia Peña and Charles Pendergraft. Copyright © 2014 by Jim 
Hawkins. 
 1. See Scot J. Paltrow & Kelly Carr, How the Pentagon’s Payroll Quag-
mire Traps America’s Soldiers, REUTERS (July 9, 2013, 6:11 PM), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-usa-pentagon-payerrors-special 
-report-idUSBRE96818I20130709 (“Pay errors in the military are wide-
spread.”).  
 2. See Marsha Shuler, LSU Agency Audit Finds Pay Errors, ADVOC. (Ba-
ton Rouge), May 22, 2007, at A4 (“[LSU] Health Sciences Center in New Orle-
ans overpaid its employees $600,000 to $700,000 in the turmoil after Hurri-
cane Katrina, the Legislative Auditor stated Monday.”). 
 3. See State Comptroller DiNapoli’s Audit Finds Employee Overpayments 
at SUNY Downstate Medical Center, U.S. ST. NEWS, Dec. 24, 2008 (“The State 
University of New York’s (SUNY) Downstate Medical Center allowed 118 cur-
rent and former employees to collect salary payments totaling $490,257 to 
which they were not entitled because of poor controls over its payroll system, 
according to an audit by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.”). Other re-
ported examples are easy to find. For just a few examples, see Diane Heldt, 
State Audit Again Notes UI Overpayments, GAZETTE (Iowa City) (July 8, 2013, 
4:15 PM), http://thegazette.com/2013/07/08/state-audit-again-notes-ui- 
overpayments (“An annual state audit noted for the third year in a row that 
the University of Iowa incorrectly made overpayments to employees. . . . It 
shows the UI incorrectly made 309 payroll overpayments totaling $805,095 
during the 2011–2012 year. That’s compared to 2010–11, when the university 
made 338 payroll overpayments to employees totaling $645,741.”); Duane 
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employers seem to be particularly susceptible to making mis-
takes in paying wages.4 On the surface, the situation may seem 
rather unremarkable—an employer pays an employee too 
much, and then the employee reimburses the overpayment 
when one of the parties discovers it. In reality, however, these 
common occurrences can wreak havoc on workers and their 
families,5 and quite remarkably, the law does virtually nothing 
to protect employees.6 
Consider two different people who owe money: a typical 
debtor—a woman who buys goods and services on credit and 
falls on hard financial times—and a commonly overpaid work-
er—a soldier. The first woman willingly entered into her credit 
relationships with credit card companies, a mortgage company, 
a car lender, or a doctor. Perhaps she spent money improvi-
dently and lived beyond her means,7 or perhaps she was driven 
to seek credit because of a liquidity crisis.8 In either case, she 
made a voluntary choice to obligate herself to repay debts in 
the future because, presumably, she thought she was better off 
having the money immediately and repaying it over time. If she 
 
Marstellar, TN Unemployment Program Problems Cost Business Owners, 
TENNESSEAN (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.tennessean.com/article/20130404/ 
BUSINESS01/106250027/TN-unemplyoment-program-problems-cost-business 
-owners (“In the report, the state comptroller’s office said the labor agency of-
ten failed to follow its own procedures in administering the program, which 
pays up to 26 weeks of benefits to employees who lose their jobs through no 
fault of their own. That led to the $73 million in overpayments to ineligible 
employees in a recent six-year period.”); At Miami-Based Jackson Health Sys-
tem, Most Paychecks Are Incorrect, HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (Apr. 9, 2010), 
http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/HR-249312/At-Miamibased- 
Jackson-Health-System-most-paychecks-are-incorrect (citing a Miami Herald 
article that reported that 7,844 of 11,900 employees at one company were paid 
incorrectly); Sarah Carr, Recovery School District’s Books Are in Better Shape, 
but Still Flawed, Audit Finds, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Jan. 25, 2010, 
8:10 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2010/01/recovery_school_ 
districts_book.html (“In response to a Times-Picayune request, RSD officials 
released in November a listing of employee overpayments since 2006, which 
totaled about $650,000.”). 
 4. For more examples, see infra Part I.A. 
 5. See infra Part I.C. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. For an article encapsulating this vision of the typical debtor, see Edith 
H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 
177, 208 (“Bankruptcy is now too frequently a choice fostered by irresponsible 
spending habits and an unwillingness to live up to commitments.”).  
 8. For an example of this view of typical debtors, see TERESA A. 
SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE 
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT xiv (2000) (“Many in the middle class are 
economically fragile, barely able to maintain their lifestyle.”). 
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suffers some exogenous shock such as a medical problem or a 
divorce and cannot repay the debt on time,9 the law offers her 
several important protections. First, her creditors cannot gar-
nish more than 25% of her wages,10 and in some states, they 
cannot garnish her wages at all.11 Second, the law limits the 
conduct of any debt collectors seeking to recover the debt to en-
sure that the debt collectors behave according to minimal 
standards of decency.12 Finally, in the event that she is unlikely 
to ever repay her debt, the Bankruptcy Code offers her a fresh 
start by allowing her to escape personal liability for her debts, 
freeing future income from the hands of her creditors.13 
The soldier, on the other hand, did not voluntarily estab-
lish a debtor/creditor relationship. She was overpaid and never 
knew about it because military wages are complicated under 
any standard. Scot Paltrow and Kelly Carr explain: “Congress 
has made [military wages] even more complicated in recent 
decades by establishing a multitude of pay levels. There is basic 
pay, plus ‘entitlements’ for everything from serving in a combat 
zone to housing allowances, to re-enlistment bonuses. An indi-
vidual’s pay can change several times in a day.”14 It is not hard 
to imagine a soldier getting paid an extra several hundred dol-
lars a month over several years and not realizing it. Not only is 
the soldier unaware of the overpayment, but also she is not to 
blame for it. The government's mistakes cause overpayments to 
 
 9. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraor-
dinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 251 (Nov. 2006) 
(“In this contemporary financial environment, families could self-fund them-
selves through a difficult financial stretch using credit, but if they misjudged 
how long they would be unemployed or how high their medical bills would 
eventually go, they would find themselves unable to regain their economic 
footing because their debts were now sky-high. In other words, the changes in 
the credit industry in making money available to troubled borrowers may have 
changed the calculus that leads to bankruptcy. For some people, the lender 
offered a way for families to stay afloat longer and delay (or perhaps evade) 
the bankruptcy day of reckoning. But delay has its own costs. The interest 
payments increased so fast that even a small stumble meant that these bor-
rowers would have to declare bankruptcy or literally never get out of debt.”). 
 10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(1) (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 28 (“No current wages for personal 
service shall ever be subject to garnishment, except for the enforcement of 
court-ordered: (1) child support payments; or (2) spousal maintenance.”). 
 12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692. 
 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2012). 
 14. Paltrow & Carr, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
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soldiers—it created the payment system, inputted the relevant 
data, and issued the check.15  
Even though the soldier spends the money on normal living 
expenses, when the government finds out about the mistake, 
it—and a spending-conscious public—obviously wants the mon-
ey back.16 Restitution provides the legal basis for correction be-
cause the mistake unjustly enriched the soldier.17 Unlike the 
first debtor, the soldier does not have the protection of re-
strictions on wage garnishment because the government is not 
a third party garnishing wages but instead is just deducting 
money for the debt from wages it owes to the soldier.18 The debt 
collection laws do not apply to an obligation created involuntar-
ily, so debt collectors are free to use a wide variety of abusive 
collection techniques to recoup the funds.19 Finally, the ulti-
mate protection for debtors—bankruptcy—is largely unavaila-
ble. Even the soldier desperate enough to file for bankruptcy is 
personally liable for a debt she never agreed to take on.20  
Soldiers, of course, are just one example, but this same 
scenario plays out for people from every line of work with every 
type of employer, and the magnitude of the errors is astound-
ing.21 Research indicates that errors cause employers to over-
pay employees by 1.2% per year on average.22 Considering the 
fact that the federal government alone spends $200 billion a 
year in its payroll,23 government employees are mistakenly 
 
 15. See id. (“Precise totals on the extent and cost of these mistakes are 
impossible to come by, and for the very reason the errors plague the military 
in the first place: the Defense Department’s jury-rigged network of mostly in-
compatible computer systems for payroll and accounting, many of them dec-
ades old, long obsolete, and unable to communicate with each other. The 
DFAS accounting system still uses a half-century-old computer language that 
is largely unable to communicate with the equally outmoded personnel man-
agement systems employed by each of the military services.”). 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. See infra Part III.C. 
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. See infra Part III.B. 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
 22. See Ayushman Baruah, Efficient Workforce Management Key To Cut-
ting Costs, FIN. EXPRESS (Mar. 26, 2009, 11:10 PM), http://www 
.financialexpress.com/news/Efficient-workforce-mgmt-key-to-cutting-
costs/439010/ (“A recent study by Nucleus Research indicates that on an aver-
age, companies overpay employees by 1.2% due to payroll errors.”). 
 23. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COMPARING THE COMPENSATION OF FEDERAL 
AND PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYEES vii (2012), available at http://www.cbo 
.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/01-30-FedPay.pdf. 
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overpaid by over $2 billion a year. And, that mistaken over-
payment represents just 1.7% of the total American workforce,24 
meaning many employees find themselves in the same situa-
tion as my hypothetical debtor/soldier. 
Comparing people indebted to credit card companies with 
mistakenly overpaid employees reveals a disturbing disjunction 
that has not received any critical attention in the literature on 
debt collection, restitution, or employment law. Involuntary, 
unknowing, and often financially fragile employees have been 
left out in the cold under current debt laws. This Article offers 
the first explication and critique of the law governing mistaken 
overpayments to employees. Although the general literature on 
restitution is very rich25 and scholars have discussed overpay-
ments in other contexts,26 scholars have not recognized the ab-
sence of laws to protect overpaid employees from abuse and 
harm. This Article uncovers current law’s failure to protect 
mistakenly overpaid employees and offers judicial and legisla-
tive strategies to shelter these employees. 
Part I discusses the mechanics of overpayments—why they 
happen, why employers work so hard to recover them, and how 
they affect employees. I draw on the military as a case study to 
provide a detailed example of the importance of this problem in 
the lives of many low-income Americans.  
Part II explains the legal framework that allows employers 
to recover mistaken overpayments. Overpayments are a classic 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. For just a few examples, see HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS 
OF RESTITUTION (2004); Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, Reme-
dies on and off Contract, 120 YALE L.J. 690 (2011); Douglas Laycock, Restoring 
Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929 (2012); Lionel Smith, Legal 
Epistemology in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 899 (2012). 
 26. See generally David C. Baldus, Welfare as a Loan: An Empirical Study 
of the Recovery of Public Assistance Payments in the United States, 25 STAN. L. 
REV. 123 (1973) (exploring welfare programs that treat some assistance as 
loans); Stephanie Ben-Ishai et al., The Role of Government as a Creditor of the 
Disadvantaged, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 539 (2010) (discussing overpayments by gov-
ernment assistance programs); Andrew Burrows, Restitution of Mistaken En-
richments, 92 B.U. L. REV. 767 (2012) (outlining several areas of conflict in the 
English law of mistaken overpayments); Marie A. Failinger, Contract, Gift, or 
Covenant? A Review of the Law of Overpayments, 36 LOY. L. REV. 89 (1990) 
(describing the law governing overpayments from welfare programs); Stella L. 
Smetanka, The Disabled in Debt to Social Security: Can Fairness Be Guaran-
teed?, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1084 (2009) (explaining the consequences of 
overpayments by the Social Security Administration); Adam S. McGonigle, 
Note, Applying Equitable Estoppel to ERISA Pension Benefit Claims, 54 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 627 (2012) (discussing pension benefit overpayments). 
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example of unjust enrichment, so I survey the law of restitution 
and defenses to restitution actions to show why employers can 
recover overpayments. More importantly, Part III explains how 
employers recover overpayments—through the self-remedy of 
setting-off future wages. Self-help allows the employer to act as 
a judge, a jury, and an agent to execute the judgment without 
any oversight from courts. 
Part IV surveys the laws that protect most debtors—debt 
collection laws, bankruptcy, and protections for wages. A care-
ful examination of these laws reveals that, contrary to our intu-
itive response, they do not protect employees who become debt-
ors because of overpayments. 
This Article concludes by suggesting ways that courts and 
legislatures can police employers’ collection efforts. I argue that 
courts should expand defenses to restitution to protect employ-
ees who rely on overpayments. The legislative suggestion is 
even more straightforward. Congress should enact a statute 
that mandates that overpayments to employees be treated like 
any other unsecured debt. This relatively uncomplicated 
change would deny employers the special collection rights sup-
plied by the current self-help remedy, and would ensure that 
employees have the same protections as other unsecured debt-
ors.  
I.   THE MECHANICS OF OVERPAYMENTS AND THE 
HARMS OF AGGRESSIVE COLLECTION   
In assessing the legal framework governing mistaken 
overpayments, it is essential to understand the context in 
which overpayments occur. This Part uses the military as a 
case study in why employees are overpaid, why employers are 
especially motivated to recoup overpayments, and why these 
efforts are so harmful to employees. Mistaken overpayments to 
military personnel are a serious problem.27 The Government 
Accountability Office conducted a study in 2012 that found that 
“the nearly $47 billion in reported fiscal year 2011 Army active 
duty military payroll includes Army service members who re-
 
 27. See 155 CONG. REC. E1355 (daily ed. June 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
Carol Shea-Porter) (stating that “[p]ayment errors are common in all military 
branches” and that military personnel report that overpayment errors were 
one of their “most significant problems”); John P. Einwechter, New Develop-
ments in Substantive Criminal Law Under the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice (1997), ARMY LAW. 20, 30 (1998) (noting that a case involving overpay-
ments is “now a familiar one to military courts”). 
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ceived pay to which they were not entitled and others who did 
not receive the full pay they were due.”28 More specifically, in 
2011, the military “was pursuing” over $50 million of pay-
related debts just for soldiers who had already left active ser-
vice.29 “[M]ilitary pay-related debts accounted for over 90 per-
cent of the Army’s out-of-service debts in fiscal year 2011.”30 
While overpayments occur in many settings,31 the military pro-
vides a rich context in which to study overpayments, and it is 
particularly important as a policy matter because it implicates 
national security concerns and public spending in addition to 
concerns about the welfare of low-income Americans. After out-
lining the reasons that overpayments are so common in the 
military (and other contexts), I describe the powerful motiva-
tion officials have for recouping overpayments from soldiers. 
This Part concludes by detailing the harmful effects that ag-
gressive collection of overpayments has on the individuals af-
fected. 
A. THE REASONS FOR OVERPAYMENTS 
Numerous entities are involved in administering pay to 
military personnel. Military pay levels and policies are set by 
the Department of Defense’s Comptroller’s Office.32 A soldier’s 
unit commander and a handful of other parts of the military 
organization generate personnel records that dictate how much 
the military should pay an employee.33 The Defense Finance 
and Accounting Service (“DFAS”) is the entity that processes 
the military’s payroll.34  
On the one hand, the military mistakenly overpays its em-
ployees for some rather mundane reasons. Overpayments may 
 
 28. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN CONTROLS OVER ARMY ACTIVE 
DUTY MILITARY PAYROLL ii (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/660/650826.pdf. 
 29. Id. at 10. 
 30. Id. 
 31. The following footnotes point out evidence that many of the issues en-
countered in the context of the military also exist in other situations as well. 
 32. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 3. 
 33. Id. at 4 (“DFAS-IN and its Military Pay Operations (Mil Pay Ops) 
staff rely on numerous Army military personnel records generated by the Ar-
my Reception Battalion installation personnel offices, Defense Military Pay 
Offices (DMPO), Army Finance Offices, Army Human Resources Command, 
and unit commanders to establish and update active duty military pay ac-
counts in DJMS-AC.”). 
 34. See id.  
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result from data entry errors35 and failures to submit the cor-
rect paperwork to change an employee’s status from, for in-
stance, service in a combat zone to service outside a combat 
zone.36  
Other causes, however, are less pedestrian. The sheer 
complexity of the military’s pay arrangement causes errors be-
cause people assigning wages have so many moving parts to 
deal with. Different positions obviously have different pay 
rates, but other factors also set an employee’s pay, including 
the length of time in service, the employee’s location, the em-
ployee’s marital status, and the employee’s dependents.37  
The military also changes its personnel’s compensation 
based on things such as “pay of medical and dental officers, pay 
for hostile fire or imminent danger, and pay for foreign lan-
guage proficiency; bonuses; allowances; allotments; tax with-
holding; and leave.”38 The system is so dynamic that pay levels 
can change throughout a single day.39 
 
 35. See id. at 19. Such errors cause overpayments in civilian industries as 
well. See Jon Ortiz, Audit: Departments Wrongly Doled Out Hourly Jobs to 
Managers, SACRAMENTO BEE (May 17, 2013), http://blogs.sacbee.com/the_ 
state_worker/2013/05/audit-departments-wrongly-doled-out-hourly-jobs-to-
managers.html (“Some of California’s most prominent departments improperly 
gave salaried managers additional jobs that pay an hourly wage, violating civil 
service rules, according to a[n] audit released late this afternoon. . . . Investi-
gators concluded the mistakes were clerical errors.”). 
 36. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 21 (“Over-
payments may occur when a servicemember returns from a combat zone de-
ployment to a duty station in the United States and the Army personnel sys-
tem fails to notify the pay system.”). Again, these sorts of errors occur outside 
the military as well. Heldt, supra note 3 (“‘Overpayments generally occur 
when electronic forms reflecting changes in employment status are not sub-
mitted by the employing department on a timely basis, according to the report. 
When payroll cutoff dates are a week in advance of the month’s end, overpay-
ments and underpayments are unavoidable given the many factors affecting 
the UI’s full-time and part-time employees,’ Moore said.”); see also Lawrence v. 
United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 550, 552 (2006) (“Plaintiff and his colleagues in 
Germany were informed that because of mismanagement and negligence by 
individuals overseeing the LQA program in Washington, D.C., they had re-
ceived these payments in excess of those authorized by statute and were re-
sponsible for repaying the overpayments.”). 
 37. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 4. 
 38. Id. at 3. 
 39. Paltrow & Carr, supra note 1. Outside the military, employers have 
also faced obstacles to correctly calculating pay because of an inability to “ac-
curately track time off,” Zachary Reid, City Schools’ Payroll Unit Criticized, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 23, 2009, at B1, and because of other com-
plicated payroll considerations. See Karen Florin, Retired DOC Worker Told 
He Was Overpaid, THEDAY.COM (Feb. 17, 2012, 3:53 PM), http://www.theday 
.com/article/20120217/NWS01/120219639 (quoting a spokesman for the Con-
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The computer software that DFAS uses to process this 
complex scheme is very old.40 One report describes the dire 
straits: 
[T]he Defense Department [uses a] jury-rigged network of mostly in-
compatible computer systems for payroll and accounting, many of 
them decades old, long obsolete, and unable to communicate with 
each other. The DFAS accounting system still uses a half-century-old 
computer language that is largely unable to communicate with the 
equally outmoded personnel management systems employed by each 
of the military services.41 
Indeed, the software is so old that the military has a hard time 
finding people who are proficient in the language it uses.42 Ad-
ditionally, accounting is complicated by the fact that the mili-
tary has literally thousands of different accounting and busi-
ness systems in place.43 Fixing problems within or even using 
 
necticut Department of Corrections explaining that overpayments are not un-
usual because “[t]he formulation of payroll is so complicated because of accru-
als of vacation time, longevity, etc.”). Complexity also causes overpayments in 
oil and gas leases. Douglas R. Hafer & Daniel B. Mathis, Mineral Royalty 
Mispayments: The Payor’s Rights, Obligations, and Risks in Royalty 
Mispayment Scenarios, Including the Pitfalls and Prerogative of Self-Help Re-
coupment, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 85, 86 (2011) (“Given an operator’s large 
volume of oil and gas production, the numerous and disparate leases under 
which production is carried out, the varying royalty fractions, the minute dec-
imal interests, and the cumbersome calculation models that often dictate roy-
alty payments, as well as the thousands of diverse payees receiving the royalty 
payments, it is inevitable that either human or electronic error will occasional-
ly cause incorrect royalty distributions. For these same reasons, such mistakes 
may go unnoticed for many months or even years.”).  
 40. See Paltrow & Carr, supra note 1. 
 41. Id. Similarly, software problems have caused other mistaken over-
payments. See At Miami-Based Jackson Health System, Most Paychecks Are 
Incorrect, supra note 3 (reporting that a software conversion led to mistakes in 
the paychecks of 7,844 of a company’s 11,900 active employees). 
 42. Paltrow & Carr, supra note 1 (“As time passes, the pool of Cobol ex-
pertise dwindles.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting an Army assis-
tant deputy chief of staff)).  
 43.  Scot J. Paltrow, The Pentagon’s Doctored Ledgers Conceal Epic Waste, 
REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2013, 9:56 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 
11/18/us-usa-pentagon-waste-specialreport-idUSBRE9AH0LQ20131118 (“No 
one can even agree on how many of these accounting and business systems are 
in use. The Pentagon itself puts the number at 2,200 spread throughout the 
military services and other defense agencies. A January 2012 report by a task 
force of the Defense Business Board, an advisory group of business leaders ap-
pointed by the [S]ecretary of [D]efense, put the number at around 5,000. 
‘There are thousands and thousands of systems,’ former Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Gordon England said in an interview. ‘I’m not sure anybody knows 
how many systems there are.’”). 
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this complex, outdated system is extremely difficult, providing 
fertile ground for mistakes to arise.44 
To compound the problems generated by the complex pay 
structure and outdated software, the military cannot effectively 
discover errors. The military lacks an efficient system for de-
tecting errors,45 and it has no mechanism for comprehensively 
assessing the accuracy of its payroll system.46 This lack of fi-
nancial controls allows mistakes to persist over time.47 The end 
result of these factors is that many military personnel encoun-
ter the problem of the military seeking to recover mistaken 
overpayments.48 
B. THE MOTIVATION FOR RECOVERING OVERPAYMENTS 
All employers are obviously motivated to recover overpay-
ments for economic reasons. People have created numerous 
guides to aid employers seeking to recover overpayments.49 But 
in the setting of the military and other public spending, anoth-
er powerful motivation is the public’s disdain for government 
waste.50 When people discover the government has mistakenly 
 
 44. See id. 
 45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 9. 
 46. Id. at 18. 
 47. Id. Poor controls over payroll systems cause overpayments in other 
contexts as well. Audit of Yonkers Schools Find Weak Internal Controls over 
Payroll, Contracts and Payments, OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER 
(Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/nov06/111606.htm 
(“Weak internal financial controls in the Yonkers City School District led to 
excess overtime payments, salaries that were higher than authorized, and im-
permissible sick leave payments to some school district employees as well as 
other accounting problems, according to an audit issued today by State Comp-
troller Alan G. Hevesi.”); State Comptroller DiNapoli’s Audit Finds Employee 
Overpayments at SUNY Downstate Medical Center, supra note 3 (“The State 
University of New York’s (SUNY) Downstate Medical Center allowed 118 cur-
rent and former employees to collect salary payments totaling $490,257 to 
which they were not entitled because of poor controls over its payroll system, 
according to an audit by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.”). 
 48. See Paltrow, supra note 43.  
 49. For one example, see M. Christine Carty & Alizah Z. Diamond, FAQ: 
Making Wage Deductions To Recover Inadvertent Overpayment of Wages, 
SCHNADER (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.schnader.com/files/Uploads/Documents/ 
SH549-L&E_ALERTFAQ.09.13-prf3.pdf. 
 50. See, e.g., Failinger, supra note 26, at 105 (describing the political pres-
sure to recover overpayments by the Social Security Administration); City’s 
Budget Missteps Draw Flak from Citizens, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 9, 2009, at 4 
(“Speakers at the meeting [about mistaken severance overpayments] said they 
were ‘appalled’ and ‘flabbergasted’ that city staff could commit such gross fi-
nancial errors.”); B.J. Reyes, Senators Upbraid Officials for Overpaying Em-
ployees, STARADVERTISER.COM (Mar. 14, 2012, 1:30 AM), http://www 
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overpaid employees, they demand that the government recover 
the money.51 Governments are criticized if they are ineffective 
in recovering mistaken payments52 and are instructed to in-
crease aggressive debt collection.53 People are enraged when 
debt collection activities against public employees cease.54 Be-
cause the military and other public entities have a strong in-
terest in preserving goodwill and funding, they experience sig-
nificant pressure to recover overpayments. 
 
.staradvertiser.com/s?action=login&f=y&id=142595426 (“State senators scold-
ed Cabinet members and other department officials Tuesday for messy 
bookkeeping and a perceived disregard for taxpayer money after discovering 
that public employees had been paid more than $2 million they weren’t due.”). 
 51. See, e.g., James Dao, Duplicate Payments Bedevil Veterans’ Pension 
System, Employees Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2012, at A19 (“‘No one has a real 
handle on this,’ Representative Michael G. Fitzpatrick, a Republican from 
Bucks County, said in an interview. ‘The V.A. management appears to believe 
it is not their responsibility to get our tax dollars back from people who should 
not have received the money in the first place.’”). 
 52. See, e.g., Josh Sweigart, State Fails To Recover $60M in Missing Tax-
payer Funds, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Mar. 8, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://www 
.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/state-fails-to-recover-60m 
-in-missing-taxpayer-fun/nMzG7 (“State watchdogs tout their ability to track 
down misspent public money. But when it comes to retrieving that money, 
state officials have been largely ineffective . . . . ‘Once we came into office, we 
saw this as something that needed to be addressed and improved,’ said Carrie 
Bartunek, spokeswoman for Auditor of State David Yost. ‘One of the primary 
purposes of our office is to protect taxpayer dollars.’”). 
 53. Ben-Ishai et al., supra note 26, at 550 (“In the 2004 report, the [Office 
of the Auditor General of Ontario] criticized the [Ontario Disability Support 
Program] for being lax in its efforts to collect the overpayments, in both active 
and inactive cases. In particular, the program was criticized for not applying 
the directive which provides that benefits on active accounts can be reduced by 
up to ten percent.”); Camden Council Calls for Inquiry, COURIER-POST (Cherry 
Hill, N.J.), May 24, 2006, at B1 (“The [S]tate Department of Community Af-
fairs continues to maintain that the city must recover $2.6 million from its 
employees for an overpayment in 2004, said spokesman Sean Darcy.”); Josh 
Richman, Audit: State Prisons Had Lousy Bookkeeping, MERCURY NEWS (San 
Jose) (July 20, 2011, 4:15 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking- 
news/ci_18516583 (“The review of California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation records found that inadequate collection efforts led to delays in 
collecting millions in overpayments for employee salary and travel advanc-
es. . . . The corrections department has now ‘prioritized the vigorous collection 
of outstanding debts’ . . . .” (quoting a corrections department administrator)). 
 54. See Teresa Walsh, Letter to the Editor, Extra Cash Belongs to Schools, 
N.Z. HERALD, Mar. 15, 2013, at A040 (“As an administrator of a school, I am 
incensed at the calling off of debt collector Baycorp’s action against teachers 
and teacher aides who are not paying back their overpayments. My school has 
had more than $58,000 overpaid since August. All those who received part of 
this money have had three letters . . . . My school is still owed $29,000, which 
is money that could be being spent on educating pupils.”). 
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C. THE HARMS OF AGGRESSIVELY RECOVERING OVERPAYMENTS 
Recovering overpayments would be unobjectionable if it 
merely resulted in reallocating the money to the party that, ab-
sent an error, should have had it. But employers’ attempts to 
recover funds often place employees in financial distress, and 
this distress has the potential to harm both the employee and 
parties completely unrelated to the transaction.55 Obviously, 
not all mistaken overpayments have negative effects—small 
overpayments that can be easily repaid are trivial. But, larger 
overpayments paid out over time can cause the employee to be-
come significantly indebted,56 leading to the harms associated 
with financial distress. And, even small increases in employees’ 
debt loads can cause problems.57 People experience distress 
when their paychecks are decreased because even small de-
creases in income for low-income Americans create problems in 
paying bills.58 Moreover, Americans in general are already 
highly leveraged.59 Americans carry more than ten times the 
amount of debt we did fifty years ago (adjusting for inflation), 
one in seven are contacted by debt collectors in a given year, 
and “the annual number of freshly minted bankruptcy debtors 
[exceeds] the number of new college graduates.”60 Adding small 
amounts of debt can push vulnerable individuals into bank-
ruptcy.61  
On the most basic level, employees are harmed when they 
suddenly have less money coming into their accounts than be-
fore. In one highly publicized case, a soldier earning $3,300 a 
 
 55. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 59–62 (2008). 
 56. See, e.g., McCarron v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 616, 617 (2008) (find-
ing that a military law enforcement officer was mistakenly paid $10,800.00 in 
wages); Lawrence v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 550, 552 (2006) (discussing 
how a transportation operation specialist in the General Services Administra-
tion was overpaid by $53,233.60 over a three year period); see also Stevedoring 
Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Eggert, 914 P.2d 737, 739, 740 (Wash. 1996) (en banc) 
(describing the Social Security Administration’s claim that it mistakenly pro-
vided $106,464.73 to an injured longshoreman). 
 57. Michael S. Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in THE BE-
HAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 440, 455 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 979, 
979–80 (2012). 
 60. Id. at 980. 
 61. See generally Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday 
Loans Cause Bankruptcy? (Vanderbilt U. L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 11-13, 2011) (arguing that just the fees associated with payday 
loans push vulnerable borrowers into bankruptcy). 
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month was instead only paid $2,337.56 for a month and then 
just $117.99 so that the government could recover an overpay-
ment.62 Because many soldiers make lower wages, even small 
mistakes in payments “can be devastating,” causing affected 
employees to turn to food pantries, emergency loans, and 
pawnshops.63 The effects of overpayments are more pronounced 
on low-income Americans,64 and many military personnel are 
vulnerable to financial harm.65 Even a representative of the De-
fense Department has recognized that recouping overpayments 
is “catastrophic.”66 The Federal Trade Commission currently 
prohibits assigning wages as a source of collateral for a loan be-
cause of the risks inherent in giving creditors the ability to dis-
rupt wages.67 
 
 62. Paltrow & Carr, supra note 1. 
 63. Id.; see also Thomas E. Geidt & Judith M. Kline, Selected Wage & 
Hour Issues, in CAL. BUS. LAW DESKBOOK § 16:18 (“[T]he Legislature has rec-
ognized the employee’s dependence on wages for the necessities of life and has, 
consequently, disapproved of unanticipated or unpredictable deductions be-
cause they impose a special hardship on employees.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Hudgins v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 46, 51–52 (Ct. App. 1995))); Samantha Valerius, Note, Safeguarding a Por-
tion of the Retirement Nest Egg: ERISA and the Need for Regulations in Re-
stricting Companies’ Ability To Recoup Overpayment of Pension Funds Made 
to Struggling Retirees, 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 423, 428 (2012) (“Even 
if a benefit [to a retiree] is merely reduced, a beneficiary’s monthly payments 
may decrease by 25 percent or more, devastating retirees with a fixed in-
come.”). 
 64. Cf. Ben-Ishai et al., supra note 26, at 542 (“[W]e show that debts owed 
to the government are especially important in the lives of low-income people.”); 
Valerius, supra note 63, at 424–25 (“Recoupment actions are legal, and com-
monly pursued by companies in all sectors of the economy. The current legal 
and regulatory environment places the burden of administrative mismanage-
ment of employee retirement plans on one of the most economically vulnerable 
populations: elderly retirees.”). 
 65. See Christopher L. Peterson, Removing the Target: Protecting Military 
Service Members and Veterans from Financial Predators, HUM. RTS., Spring 
2008, at 8 (“The great majority of service members are young, junior enlisted 
personnel who are frequently from economically challenged backgrounds. 
Moreover, most enlisted personnel have limited education experiences—
indeed, the opportunity to save for an education is one of the primary benefits 
of military service. . . . And military culture and codes of conduct demand 
prompt repayment of even onerous and unfair debts.”). 
 66.  DOD and VA Collaboration To Assist Service Members Returning to 
Civilian Life: J. Hearing with H. Armed Servs. Comm. Before the H. Comm. on 
Veterans’ Affairs, 113th Cong. 19 (2013) (statement of Jessica L. Wright, Act-
ing Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Department of 
Defense). 
 67. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(3) (1988). 
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Beyond the problems associated with a period of having a 
lower income, there are also problems associated with being in 
debt. There is a substantial body of evidence that indicates a 
heavy debt load can harm individuals experiencing financial 
distress, their families, and even their employers.68 In terms of 
the individuals themselves, debt can: cause people to diminish 
their wealth;69 prevent people from getting future jobs because 
employers check potential employees’ credit scores;70 lead to 
medical problems;71 affect access to credit and the terms of the 
credit;72 and lower self-esteem.73  
In addition to the costs to the employee, debt can hurt 
third parties.74 Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren summarize 
the research on these costs: 
  The costs of financial distress are borne by immediate family 
members. . . .  
  The impact of financial distress does not stop with the immediate 
family. An individual in financial distress will often require support 
from more distant family, friends, or the state. Such transfers from 
one individual to another, including transfers mediated by the state, 
involve transaction costs. . . .  
  Financial distress also affects the productivity of borrowers-
workers. Recent evidence collected by the [Department of Defense] 
shows that employees or, in the [Department of Defense’s] case, mili-
tary personnel, become less productive when in financial distress. 
This finding should not come as a surprise. An employee concerned 
about debt repayment and about protecting her family from abusive 
debt-collection practices is clearly less able to focus on work.75  
 
 68. See generally Porter, supra note 59.  
 69. Id. at 1005. 
 70. Jonathan Berr, Should Employers Be Barred from Using Credit Re-
ports in Hiring?, CBS NEWS (Dec. 17, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.cbsnews 
.com/news/should-employers-be-prohibited-from-using- 
credit-reports-in-hiring. 
 71. Matthias Keese & Hendrik Schmitz, Broke, Ill, and Obese: The Effect 
of Household Debt on Health (Ruhr Econ. Paper No. 234, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1735420 (drawing a causal 
link between debt and physical/mental health). 
 72. See generally Katherine Porter, Bankrupt Profits: The Credit Indus-
try’s Business Model for Postbankruptcy Lending, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1369 (2008). 
 73. Porter, supra note 59, at 1011–12. 
 74. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 55. 
 75. Id.; cf. Amanda Harmon Cooley, Promissory Education: Reforming the 
Federal Student Loan Counseling Process To Promote Informed Access and To 
Reduce Student Debt Burdens, 46 CONN. L. REV. 119, 140 (2013) (arguing in 
the context of student loans that “excessive debts and inabilities to repay those 
debts have resulted in acute harms to individual students, their families, and 
society at large”). 
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In the military specifically, mistaken overpayments can 
have even further reaching effects because financial distress 
can inhibit efficacious service.76 If soldiers are focusing on ways 
to generate money to repay mistaken overpayments while deal-
ing with wage deductions, lawsuits, or debt collection calls, the 
financial distress can “detract from their focus on mission.”77 If 
soldiers feel desperate for cash to repay an employer, they are 
more susceptible to extortion and more likely to lose their secu-
rity clearance.78 
In short, mistaken overpayments are commonplace, em-
ployers are very motivated to recover overpayments, and this 
aggressive recovery has the potential to harm vulnerable em-
ployees and their families. Recovery is only a lifeless threat, 
however, if employers lack a legal basis on which to recoup 
overpayments. The next Part describes the legal foundation for 
recovery actions and how employers actually recoup mistaken 
overpayments. 
II.  ESTABLISHING AN EMPLOYEE’S LIABILITY FOR 
OVERPAYMENTS—IN LAW AND IN FACT   
Employers have a firm legal foundation for recovering 
overpayments because of the law of restitution. While employ-
ees theoretically have several defenses to restitution available 
to them under the law, these defenses only apply in narrow in-
stances and will not generally help an overpaid employee avoid 
repayment. Moreover, employers rarely go through the courts 
to collect overpayments. Instead, they use a self-help remedy—
offsetting any debt they believe the employee owes against the 
employee’s future wages.  
A. THE LAW: WHY EMPLOYERS CAN LEGALLY RECOVER 
OVERPAYMENTS 
Restitution is a claim lawyers are increasingly turning to 
in litigation,79 and absent a contractual provision that allows an 
 
 76U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 20. 
 77. Id. See also Scott Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In Harm’s Way: Payday 
Loan Access and Military Personnel Performance, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. 
Research Dep’t, Working Paper No. 08-18, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1269414 (finding “some evidence that payday loan ac-
cess has adverse effects on job performance and readiness”). 
 78. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 55. 
 79. George P. Roach, Unjust Enrichment in Texas: Is It a Floor Wax or a 
Dessert Topping?, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 153, 156 (2013) (“The rapid growth in the 
number of cases relating to unjust enrichment in both state and federal courts 
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employer to recover overpayments,80 restitution is the primary 
legal theory for employers attempting to recover overpayments 
made to employees.81 As summarized by the recently completed 
Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, resti-
tution’s general principle is that a “person who is unjustly en-
riched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitu-
tion.”82  
Overpaying on a contractual obligation is a paradigmatic 
example of unjust enrichment83: “Payment by mistake gives the 
payor a claim in restitution against the recipient to the extent 
payment was not due.”84 Overpaying an employee is an example 
of over performance of contractual obligations.85 The doctrine of 
restitution’s goal in these situations is to “bring the transfers 
between the parties into conformity with the true state of their 
contractual obligations”86 by compelling the employee to return 
the overpayment.87 
 
over the last twenty years confirms an increasing presence in litigation.”). 
 80. See Northcutt v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 467 
F.3d 1031, 1032–33 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting a provision in an employment con-
tract obligating the employee to repay any mistaken overpayments); Ravetto 
v. Triton Thalassic Techs., Inc., 941 A.2d 309, 325 (Conn. 2008) (noting in the 
context of advances on commissions, “many courts have reasoned that because 
the employer usually drafts the employment agreement, it easily may include 
language in the agreement obligating the employee to repay any advances that 
exceed commissions”). 
 81. See, e.g., W. E. Neely, Liability for Overpayment of Allotments, JAG J., 
Nov. 1953, at 13 (discussing restitution as the legal theory used to recover 
mistaken overpayments to military personnel); Cindy Carcamo, Surf City Offi-
cials Sue Ex-Employee They Mistakenly Overpaid, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Jan. 
2, 2009), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/city-128478-brooks-officials.html 
(“City officials are suing a former employee, hoping to collect thousands after 
they mistakenly overpaid the Lake Forest woman more than $85,000 in re-
tirement benefits. . . . ‘Brooks was unjustly enriched by the overpayment of 
supplemental retirement benefits,’ the lawsuit states.”). 
 82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 
(2010). 
 83. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 
TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1284 (1989). In his seminal essay on restitution, Douglas 
Laycock explains that one place where restitution matters most is situations 
where restitution is the only basis for civil liability. See id. The first example 
of such a situation he offers is where a defendant is “enriched by mistake, as 
in cases of mistaken payments . . . .” Id. 
 84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6 
(2010). 
 85. See id. § 6 cmt. c. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. One recent case summarizes some courts’ approach succinctly: 
“In fact, courts grant recovery in this situation—whether the mistake is exclu-
sively the employer’s or a mutual one—‘almost as a matter of course and with-
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This result is unsurprising if the employee who receives an 
overpayment knows of the overpayment and accepts it anyway, 
and the employer’s mistake in overpaying is an innocent one.88 
But what is the result if the employer’s negligence caused the 
overpayment? On the one hand, the Restatement explains that 
a claimant cannot “profit by his own wrong,”89 so if an employer 
knowingly overpays an employee, the employer will not be able 
to recover.90 But restitution generally requires that claimants 
be conscious of their wrongdoing for courts to prevent them 
from using restitution to recover overpayments,91 so negligent 
overpayment does not preclude restitution.92 Thus, even if an 
employer is negligent in overpaying an employee, restitution 
gives that employer a right to recover the mistaken payment. 
Depending on the circumstances, employees may be able to 
raise several defenses to employers’ claims for restitution, but 
none of them are likely to work in most cases. First, if the em-
ployer’s compensation system is extremely unreliable, employ-
 
out extended discussion.’” Baylor v. Gen. Anesthesia Servs., Inc., Civil Action 
No. 2:04–CV–01265, 2006 WL 2290707, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 8, 2006) (quot-
ing G.B. Crook, Annotation, Recovery Back by Employer of Compensation Paid 
to Employee as Result of Mistake or the Employee’s Fraud, 88 A.L.R.2d 1437, 
1451 (1963)); see also Duncan v. Office Depot, 973 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Or. 1997); 
Green Local Teachers Ass’n v. Blevins, 539 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) 
(holding a board of education could recover overpayments made to teachers 
because of the education board’s treasurer’s miscalculation); Salvati v. 
Streator Twp. High School Dist. No. 40, 200 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964); 
Aebli v. Bd. of Educ., 145 P.2d 601 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (holding that em-
ployer could get overpayments back without considering the fact that employ-
ees relied on the wages and did not seek other jobs).  
 88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 6 cmt. a (2010) (“On the other hand, the recipient of a mistaken payment 
who is aware at the time of the payor’s mistake is almost certain to be liable in 
restitution, because notice to the recipient will foreclose the most significant of 
the affirmative defenses.”). 
 89. Id. § 3. 
 90. Cassells v. Hill, No. 1:07-CV-2755-TCB, 2010, WL 4616573, at *11 
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 8, 2010) (denying an employer’s motion for summary judgment 
to recover wages mistakenly paid because “Cassells [the employee] does resist 
the county’s claim and argues against the unfairness of refunding his salary 
and benefits when, according to Cassells, the county knew that he was no 
longer working in the Sheriff’s Office but continued paying him anyway”). 
 91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 
cmt. a (2010). 
 92. Id. § 65 cmt. a (“[A] recipient’s primary liability in unjust enrichment 
is usually independent of questions of fault. The claimant in a mistaken-
payment case has often been negligent; the recipient is typically blameless. 
Liability is initially imposed without reference to this comparison, because 
(but only so long as) the recipient is not being asked to bear any loss.”).  
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ees could invoke the voluntary payment rule as a defense to a 
restitutionary claim. As we might guess from the name, the 
voluntary payment rule prevents payors from recovering pay-
ments that are made voluntarily.93 Typically, the rule involves 
payments made as a result of mistakes about legal rules where 
the payor makes a payment and later discovers the payment 
was not legally compelled.94 Mistakes of fact, on the other hand, 
do not usually give rise to this defense.95 The rule exists pri-
marily to support lawsuit settlements by making payments 
binding even in light of uncertain legal rules.96 
Mistaken overpayment in the employment context is al-
most by definition involuntary or a mistake of fact, making the 
defense generally inapplicable. Yet, the voluntary payment rule 
includes payments made “in the face of a recognized uncertain-
ty as to the existence or extent of the payor’s obligation,”97 and 
some courts consider a payor’s failure to investigate the facts 
sufficient to prevent the payor from seeking restitution for a 
mistaken payment. In Bank of Saipan v. CNG Financial Corp., 
a bank and a company were both defrauded by a third party 
who got a loan from the bank and paid the money to the com-
pany.98 The bank sued the company for unjust enrichment, but 
the company defended by arguing that the bank had “unclean 
hands” because it failed to investigate the third party’s credit 
and collateral before giving him the loan.99 The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals sent the case back to a jury to determine 
whether the bank’s negligence contributed to its losses and 
thus should reduce its claim against the company.100 In the 
same way, a court might hold that an employer who routinely 
 
 93. Id. § 6 cmt. e. 
 94. Hafer & Mathis, supra note 39, at 91–92. 
 95. Id. (“The [voluntary payment rule] is an effective defense even if the 
payor is mistaken as to his legal obligation to pay—an error commonly re-
ferred to as a ‘mistake of law.’ . . . That being said, overpayments may be re-
covered if they are made due to a ‘mistake of fact.’ In this regard, recovery of 
payments based on a mistake of fact does not violate the policies underlying 
the [voluntary payment rule] because such mistakes do not contribute to the 
party’s determination of its liability to pay, and such factual mistakes general-
ly vitiate the ‘voluntariness’ of the payment.”). 
 96. Id. at 90. 
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6 
cmt. e (2010).   
 98. Bank of Saipan v. CNG Fin. Corp., 380 F.3d 836, 838–39 (5th Cir. 
2004). 
 99. Id. at 841–42. 
 100. Id. at 842.  
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overpays employees has unclean hands and should not recover 
completely. While a negligent mistake of a fact might not quali-
fy for the voluntary payment defense as a complete bar to re-
covery, it could reduce any recovery for an employer.101 
Still, courts might be unwilling to extend the voluntary 
payment defense beyond its traditional boundaries, making it 
problematic for employees to use.102 Also, for many overpay-
ment cases, the employee will be unable to establish that the 
employer was negligent in designing its compensation system, 
further limiting the usefulness of this defense. 
Second, some employees could raise an affirmative defense 
that the overpayment caused a detrimental change of position. 
Section 65 of the Third Restatement of Restitution outlines the 
defense: “If receipt of a benefit has led a recipient without no-
tice to change position in such manner that an obligation to 
make restitution of the original benefit would be inequitable to 
the recipient, the recipient’s liability in restitution is to that ex-
tent reduced.”103 Employees who spend the money their employ-
ers overpay them can establish a defense to restitution if they 
can establish that they only spent the money because of the 
overpayment. The comments to the Restatement explain: 
When a claimant makes a payment that is otherwise subject to resti-
tution, the fact that the recipient has spent the money is not of itself a 
defense to liability in restitution, because an expenditure of funds—
without more—does not constitute a change of position. To be entitled 
to a defense on this ground, the recipient must demonstrate a causal 
 
 101. See Hafer & Mathis, supra note 39, at 97 (“If the payor was negligent, 
or was carelessly ignorant of the facts as to which he was mistaken, while not 
necessarily barring recovery, those factors could be considered in determining 
the equities between the parties and may reduce the amount of recovery.”). 
Another possible variation of this defense is that if a party is negligent in dis-
covering an overpayment, a court might deny recovery for the overpayment 
because the party overpaying did not notify the other party within a reasona-
ble time. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Jay Indus., Inc., 459 F.3d 717, 724–25 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (holding plaintiff can only recover amount of overpayment after no-
tice was given since notice was not given in a reasonable time). 
 102. See Helen Scott & Danie Visser, Excess Baggage? Rethinking Risk Al-
location in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 859, 880 (2012) (discussing mistaken overpayments of legitimate 
obligations and concluding that it could not “conceivably nullify a contract in 
accordance with the provisions of sections 151 through 154 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts”). 
 103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 65 (2010). The defense has a long history in English law. See, e.g., Buller v. 
Harrison, [1777] 98 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B.). For a discussion of English law’s 
conceptualization of the defense, see Yung F. Chiang, Payment by Mistake in 
English Law, 11 FLA. J. INT’L L. 91, 158–62 (1996). 
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relationship between receipt and expenditure: in other words, that 
the expenditure is one that would not have been made but for the 
payment or transfer for which the claimant seeks restitution. 
  Because this causal relationship is usually conceded, the more 
important test relates to the nature of the expenditure. Spending 
money is normally not a change of position unless the consequence of 
rejecting the defense (and imposing a liability in restitution) would be 
a net decrease in the recipient’s assets. Expenditures devoted to ex-
traordinary consumption or to gifts have this effect; ordinary living 
expenses, debt repayment, and the acquisition of capital assets gen-
erally do not.104 
Many employees that receive overpayments likely spend the 
money on ordinary living expenses, rendering this defense un-
helpful. One of the Restatement’s illustrations describes an em-
ployer overpaying an employee because of a clerical error relat-
ing to the employee’s W2. If the IRS forces the employer to pay 
the money to the Treasury, the employer “has a prima facie en-
titlement to restitution from [the e]mployee.”105 Such an em-
ployee, the Restatement explains, could not use a change of po-
sition to defend against the restitution claim if the employee 
“defends on the ground that the refund has been consumed in 
everyday living expenses.”106 
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Levy107 provides one of many examples 
of this rule in action.108 In PaineWebber, the claimant mistaken-
ly overpaid the defendant because of confusion concerning a re-
verse stock split.109 The defendant argued he should not have to 
repay the mistaken payment because he spent the money on “a 
 
 104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 65 cmt. c. 
 105. Id. § 65 cmt. c, illus. 12. 
 106. Id.; cf. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Appalachian Railcar Serv., Inc., 509 F.3d 
384, 388 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying Indiana law and holding that the mere fact 
someone has spent money given to them by mistake does not preclude a claim 
for restitution). 
 107. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Levy, 680 A.2d 798 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1995). 
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Reagan, 651 F. Supp. 387, 388 (D. Mass. 
1987) (spending money from a mistaken tax refund did not establish a detri-
mental change of position); Monroe Fin. Corp. v. DiSilvestro, 529 N.E.2d 379, 
384 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (spending money on home improvement did not meet 
the elements for a detrimental change of position); Westamerica Sec., Inc. v. 
Cornelius, 520 P.2d 1262, 1270 (Kan. 1974) (“If the payee uses the erroneous 
payment to pay debts existing when he received the money, or to pay living 
expenses, there is no change of position as will be a defense to an action to re-
cover the payment.”); Messersmith v. G.T. Murray & Co., 667 P.2d 655, 658 
(Wyo. 1983) (concluding payment of bills and the purchase of a house did not 
meet the test of change of position). 
 109. PaineWebber, Inc., 680 A.2d at 798. 
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past debt to his veterinarian,” “his daughter’s college tuition 
and expenses, including $2500 for a new computer,” and his 
“own living expenses.”110 The court refused to grant summary 
judgment on the detrimental change of position defense on all 
the expenses except the computer purchase because it found 
that the defendant incontestably “would not have purchased 
the computer, but for the overpayment”111 but that there were 
genuine issues of material fact concerning the other expenses.112 
Some older cases use a more generalized approach and 
hold that spending money is never a change of position because 
the person spending the money receives something of value 
from the exchange, so the person is not worse off.113 Kunkel v. 
Kunkel, a case from 1920, exemplifies this view:  
 
 110. Id. at 799. 
 111. Id. at 800.  
 112. Id. The court’s analysis is worth considering: 
  Genuine issues of material fact exist which make summary judg-
ment inappropriate in the case at bar. It is unclear whether Levy 
would have paid for his daughter’s college tuition and expenses ab-
sent the overpayment. He had paid for her tuition during prior semes-
ters, but in September 1993, both Levy and his wife were discharged 
from Chapter 7 bankruptcy. If Levy would have paid for his daugh-
ter’s college expenses (approximately $12,000) without the benefit of 
the overpayment, then restitution of that amount is appropriate. 
  In addition, it is unclear which of Levy’s living expenses were or-
dinary, and which were induced by his good faith reliance upon his 
right to the $25,000 overpayment. For example, Levy testifies that he 
“was watching the money even though I was a little easier . . . giving 
out money at that time because I had this amount of money and I 
thought that it was going to increase three times.” While one may in-
fer from this statement that Levy did not use the proceeds for any-
thing but ordinary living expenses, he goes on to state that he would 
not have purchased a $2500 computer for his daughter without the 
overpayment. Plaintiff’s motion and defendant’s cross motion for 
summary judgment are denied, because genuine issues of material 
fact remain as to what portion of the overpayment was detrimentally 
relied upon by Levy in his expenditures for living expenses and his 
daughter’s college expenses.  
Id. Like in other cases, the change of position defense could be a partial de-
fense here. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cent. Nat. Bank, 112 
N.E.2d 636, 645 (Ohio 1953). 
 113. See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Gilpin, 84 A. 448, 450 (Pa. 1912) (“It has 
been sometimes said that plaintiff’s laches will preclude recovery unless de-
fendant can be put in status quo. And it is upon this principle that it was 
sought to be proven here that defendant had spent the money. There is neither 
reason nor authority, however, to support the theory that the mere fact of the 
money having been spent amounts to an alteration of defendant’s legal posi-
tion. It is enough to say that, if it were so, the instances in which the right to 
recover has been affirmed would have been much less frequent.”). 
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 If defendant spent the money, presumably he has either the things 
which it purchased or the benefit therefrom; or, if, as intimated in a 
refused offer of proof, he set the fund aside for the benefit of, or gave 
it to, his mother (for whose support he had a contingent legal liabil-
ity), this cannot fairly be said to represent a loss to him, which bars 
plaintiffs.”114  
Some recent cases seem to follow this reasoning, holding, for 
instance, that a defendant who paid off her mortgage with a 
mistaken payment had not detrimentally relied on the over-
payment because she retained the value of that payment.115 
But, there are other cases like PaineWebber where courts 
have found that a change of position barred a claim for restitu-
tion. The elements of the defense that many courts require the 
defendant to establish are that the “change must be detri-
mental to the payee, material and irrevocable.”116 A Texas court 
of appeals case, Lincoln National Life Insurance Company v. 
Rittman, illustrates the sort of facts that meet the elements.117 
In Rittman, an insurance company erroneously overpaid a hos-
pital for treatments it was giving to an insured’s daughter.118 
The insurance company sued the hospital and the insured to 
recover the payments, and the insured defended by testifying 
“that he could not have kept his daughter in treatment without 
the extended payments, and that he would have withdrawn her 
if he had had to pay the medical costs personally.”119 The court 
did not think that recovery would be equitable under the cir-
cumstances, likely because of the insured’s extraordinary ex-
 
 114. Kunkel v. Kunkel, 110 A. 73, 75 (Pa. 1920). 
 115. Ohio Co. v. Rosemeir, 288 N.E.2d 326, 329 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972). See 
also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. Mann, 814 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that converting a mistaken payment into a real estate investment 
was not a detrimental change of position); Monroe Fin. Corp. v. DiSilvestro, 
529 N.E.2d 379, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding purchasing furniture and 
appliances was not a detrimental change of position); Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co., 112 N.E.2d at 645 (holding that bank’s use of overpayment as security for 
a loan was not a detrimental change of position). 
 116. Capin v. S & H Packing Co., 636 P.2d 1223, 1224 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) 
(quoting Jonklaas v. Silverman, 370 A.2d 1277, 1281 (R.I. 1977)). On the ir-
revocable element, see Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 814 F.2d at 306 (holding 
that a defendant had not detrimentally changed his position by using funds to 
acquire real estate investments because the value of the mistaken payment 
had not been lost but merely had been converted into an investment). 
 117. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Rittman, 790 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1990). 
 118. Id. at 792. 
 119. Id.  
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penses, and therefore denied the insurance company from re-
covering its overpayments.120 
So, an employee could theoretically use the detrimental 
change of position defense, but only if the employee made ex-
traordinary purchases with the overpayment. In addition to be-
ing limited to this small group of defendants, however, this de-
fense may be hard to establish because the employee has the 
burden of proof.121 More importantly, for members of the mili-
tary, the fact that payments to military personnel involve pub-
lic funds makes the defense even harder to establish. When 
public money is involved, courts are less likely to allow individ-
ual litigants to keep money because it thwarts the will of the 
public.122 In Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, the 
Supreme Court rejected a claim from a Navy employee for dis-
ability annuity payments despite the fact he relied on a federal 
government employee’s advice.123 The erroneous advice, even if 
it caused the employee to become ineligible for disability annui-
ty payments, did not give rise to an estoppel case against the 
Government requiring payments because “the payment of mon-
ey from the Treasury must be authorized by a statute.”124 While 
the Court did not hold that estoppel could never lie against the 
Government, it noted that “[f]rom our earliest cases, we have 
recognized that equitable estoppel will not lie against the Gov-
ernment as it lies against private litigants.”125 For overpay-
ments to military personnel, a court would likely hold that an 
equitable defense like change of position cannot prevent the 
Government from recovering overpayments from the Treasury. 
Thus, for many employees, overpayment results in liability 
to employers under restitution for the overpaid amount, and 
the employee will have no viable defense. The employer can go 
to court and seek relief. The problem with all of the preceding 
analysis, of course, is that employees and employers are rarely 
ever before courts to determine what the employer should re-
cover. Instead of using the State as the agent to adjudicate and 
 
 120. See id. at 794. 
 121. Hafer & Mathis, supra note 39, at 94. 
 122. See Romano v. Ret. Bd. of Emps. Ret. Sys. 767 A.2d 35, 45 (R.I. 2001) 
(finding the defense inapplicable in part because “we are dealing with exces-
sive pension payments involving public funds”). 
 123. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 416 (1990). 
 124. Id. at 424. 
 125. Id. at 419. 
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recover an overpayment, employers take matters into their own 
hands through self-help remedies. 
B. THE REALITY: HOW EMPLOYERS ACTUALLY RECOVER 
OVERPAYMENTS  
Instead of going to court to have a judge decide the rele-
vant rules of law that govern a particular overpayment situa-
tion, a jury resolve the important factual questions, and the 
State enforce any judgment, many employers act as a judge, a 
jury, and an enforcer by exercising a self-help remedy. Simply, 
the employer withholds payment from an employee’s paycheck 
pursuant to set-off law.126 Subject to a few restrictions described 
in Part IV, if the employer has overpaid an employee, the em-
ployer just pays the employee less money than the employee ac-
tually earned until the employer recovers the full amount.127 As 
the Government Accountability Office explains, “For active du-
ty soldiers, . . . overpayments result in a deduction to the sol-
dier’s pay.”128 This administrative offset, as it is called, occurs 
frequently when employees owe the government money. For in-
stance, in 2010, the Veteran’s Administration referred ninety-
nine percent of its eligible debt to the agency that administers 
set-offs to employees’ payments.129 If the employer cannot re-
 
 126. Self-help usually means “a privilege to do something that would oth-
erwise be legally actionable in order to prevent or cure a legal wrong.” Cathe-
rine M. Sharkey, Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age, 44 TULSA 
L. REV. 677, 683 (2009). Set-offs are not always a self-help remedy, but in the 
context of an employer recouping overpayments, they are a unilateral act 
without judicial involvement. See John C. McCoid, II, Setoff: Why Bankruptcy 
Priority?, 75 VA. L. REV. 15, 32 (1989) (“In a narrow sense [set-off], too, is a 
procedure followed in the course of civil litigation to balance the mutual obli-
gations of the plaintiff and the defendant. But setoff sometimes operates out-
side of judicial proceedings and may involve no more than a unilateral act by 
the creditor.”). 
 127. For one example of a state law explicitly authorizing set-off for mis-
taken overpayment, see N.Y. LAB. LAW § 193 (2009). The federal government re-
lies on set-offs to obtain refunds for overpayment of vacation pay due to the un-
earned leaves of separated administrative personnel. 5 C.F.R. § 630.209(a)(2). 
Parties making mistaken payments also resort to self-help when they overpay 
royalties in oil and gas leases. “[P]ayors routinely recoup royalty overpay-
ments through unilateral ‘adjustments,’ ‘off-sets,’ ‘revenue rebooking,’ or oth-
erwise withholding or debiting a payee’s future royalties until the overpaid 
amounts are collected.” Hafer & Mathis, supra note 39, at 98. Similarly, set-
offs are common when the Social Security Administration wants to recover 
overpayments. Deborah I. Ginsberg, Preventing Social Security Overpayments 
to Older Claimants, 3 ELDER L.J. 275, 290 (1995). 
 128. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 5. 
 129. Stacy L.Z. Edwards, Note, The Department of Veterans Affairs’ Enti-
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cover the overpayment directly through withholding payments, 
it can still hire private debt collectors to seek repayment out-
side the judicial process.130  
Set-off law allows a creditor to set off money it owes to a 
debtor by the amount of debt the debtor owes to it.131 For in-
stance, if a debtor owes a creditor $1,000, but the creditor owes 
the debtor $200, the creditor can just reduce the amount the 
debtor owes to $800 without any judicial involvement.132 With-
out the right to an set-off, the creditor would have to pay the 
debtor the $200 it owes, and then seek the $1,000 the debtor 
owes the creditor through a separate legal action. If the debtor 
can pay the full $1,000, then the set-off right is inconsequential 
and has no distributional effects. It merely increases efficiency 
by compressing the transactions.133 On the other hand, if the 
debtor is insolvent, the creditor without a set-off right pays the 
$200 and gets in line with all other unsecured creditors for a 
portion of the debtor’s estate. Thus, the set-off is an efficient 
and powerful tool for creditors to obtain full payment from a 
debtor.134 
Employers recovering overpayments by deducting from 
employees’ wages is analogous to the classic self-help remedy: 
the rights a secured creditor has under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.135 Under Article 9, if a debtor defaults on a 
loan and the creditor has a security interest in some collateral 
from the debtor, the creditor does not have to go to court and 
 
tlement Complex: Attorney Fees and Administrative Offset After Astrue v. Rat-
liff, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 561, 587 (2011). 
 130. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 6 (“Thus, if 
debts are not paid before the soldier separates from military service, [the De-
fense Finance and Accounting Service] can refer these debts to private collec-
tion contractors.”); Paltrow & Carr, supra note 1 (describing how military per-
sonnel who have been overpaid have been “pursued by private collection 
agencies”).  
 131. Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1641, 
1665 (2013). 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 1664. 
 134. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011). 
 135. There are many other analogies, such as the Uniform Computer In-
formation Transactions Act. It enables a licensor of a computer program to 
electronically erase a copy of a program without judicial process upon cancel-
lation of a license. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 815 
(2009). Another non-commercial example is the right of theft victims to use 
reasonable force to recapture their possessions. Adam B. Badawi, Self-Help 
and the Rules of Engagement, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 (2012). 
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get a judgment and drag the sheriff out to levy on the debtor’s 
property.136 Instead, as a general matter, Article 9 empowers 
the secured creditor to just go get the collateral137 and sell it to 
repay the debt138 or keep the collateral itself as payment for the 
debt.139  
This self-help power is “very valuable” to secured credi-
tors140 and “one advantage of having a security interest.”141 For 
one thing, it saves the time and costs associated with litiga-
tion.142 Also, it helps the lender control how the collateral is 
maintained.143 Finally, it supplies significant bargaining lever-
age that allows secured creditors who have possession of the 
debtor’s property to hold the property hostage until the debtor 
agrees to more favorable terms.144  
While self-help remedies are extremely valuable to secured 
creditors, they also create “serious social dangers.”145 Because 
creditors decide for themselves whether the debtor has default-
ed on the loan agreement, self-help repossessions provide debt-
ors no due process rights before the creditor seizes the proper-
ty.146 Margaret Jane Radin has argued that excessive self-help 
undermines the rule of law:  
[W]orst, self-help can degenerate into vigilante “justice,” which might 
better be described as a partial retreat from the liberal ideals of civil 
society. Too much self-help “invite[s] disorderly scrambles”; that is, a 
return to the war of all against all in which it is every man for him-
 
 136. The secured creditor can pursue a judicial foreclosure, UNIF. COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 9-609(b)(1), 3 U.L.A. 671 (2010), but almost none do. 
 137. Id. § 9-609(a)(1). 
 138. Id. § 9-610(a). 
 139. Id. § 9-620(a). 
 140. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 795, 844 n.207 (2004). 
 141. Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty 
in Commercial Law, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 549, 568 (1997). 
 142. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYS-
TEMS APPROACH 40 (7th ed. 2012). 
 143. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 625, 683 (1997) (observing that secured credit limits “the bor-
rower’s ability to engage in conduct that lessens the likelihood of repayment”). 
 144. LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 142, at 40. 
 145. Westbrook, supra note 140, at 844 n.207. 
 146. Samuel J.M. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial Law, 50 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 405, 466 (2000) (“Given the widespread abuse of self-help 
repossession, our legislature, when it considers adopting Rev. Art. 9, should 
consider whether we can do without UCC Rev. section 9-609(b)(2). At least 
given the total absence of due process of law in self-help repossession . . . .”). 
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self, the condition that the state is supposed to supplant with its 
peaceful juridical order of mutual reciprocal rights and obligations.147 
Self-help remedies also invite the risk of mistakes as the lender 
alone weighs its rights and liabilities.148 The risk of mistake is 
especially problematic if it has serious consequences, such as a 
landlord exercising self-help through an eviction on a residen-
tial property, leaving a family without a place to live.149  
The situation of the employer and the secured creditor are 
deeply similar. In the context of a collateralized loan, the lend-
er has valuable property to repay the debt, and in the context of 
employment, the employer has the value of the employee’s fu-
ture wages. In fact, the weak economic condition of many em-
ployees makes them essentially judgment-proof because they 
lack the resources to repay an overpayment if it was reduced to 
a judgment,150 so the promise of future wages is the most valu-
able thing the employee has.151 While both Article 9 reposses-
sion and wage withholding can be challenged in court after the 
fact, they both proceed without any due process on the front 
end. And, just like a secured creditor can maximize the value of 
the collateral by quickly repossessing and selling it, the most 
efficient and effective way to collect debts from employees is by 
 
 147. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 49–50 (2013) (quoting Tapscott v. Cobbs, 52 
Va. (11 Gratt.) 172, 177 (1854)).  
 148. See generally Badawi, supra note 135 (critiquing the self-help litera-
ture’s focus on the risk of violence and offering the risk of mistakes as an al-
ternative justification for restrictions on self-help). 
 149. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through 
Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326, 382 (2006) (“The goal of restrictions on 
eviction is to prevent the grave, negative effects on people’s welfare caused by 
immediate eviction. Individuals’ self-respect, self-esteem, and ability to act au-
tonomously are severely diminished if they can be dispossessed overnight, and 
the landlord can throw their belongings into the street. Such extreme insecuri-
ty in one’s own shelter adversely affects the possibility of realizing additional 
objective values, such as understanding and accomplishment.”); Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
103, 107 (2002) (“Respect for human dignity, for example, may justify a rule 
protecting tenants from eviction without a court proceeding ensuring that the 
landlord is legally entitled to the eviction. Requiring the landlord to use court-
supervised evictions also ensures that the tenant has sufficient time to 
move.”). 
 150. Daniel Stanton, Comment, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Mainte-
nance and Cure in the Wake of Atlantic Sounding, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 471, 491 
(2012) (“In many cases an employee may in fact be judgment proof.”). 
 151. Cf. Ben-Ishai et al., supra note 26, at 544 (“[T]he government, which is 
often [assistance recipients’] most important creditor, controls their income 
and has more collection options than private creditors.”). 
HAWKINS_4FMT 11/3/2014 4:44 PM 
116 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:89 
 
offsetting current wages.152 Self-help offsetting is even more 
useful for employers because employers can use overpayments 
as a defense to an employee’s breach of contract or conversion 
suit even if the employer could not recover in restitution for 
some reason.153 Also, the fact that employees are so often judg-
ment-proof creates an incentive for employers to sweat out 
small payments from employees’ wages over time.154 
For the same reasons, the self-help remedy of withholding 
wage payments is even more dangerous than self-help repos-
session under Article 9. Like in the context of Article 9, the em-
ployer might make mistakes about whether an overpayment 
has been made and the extent of the overpayment,155 and like a 
mistake about an eviction in residential real estate, mistaken 
wage withholding can have serious negative consequences for 
employees who are left with less funds than they expected. 
Such mistakes generate externalities when they are corrected 
because the party making the mistake does not bear all the 
costs associated with its correction.156 Worse than the externali-
ties associated with correcting mistakes, however, is the risk 
that the mistakes will not be discovered by employees and, 
even if they are discovered, will not be corrected because of the 
costs of doing so.157 An employee’s inability to discover or correct 
 
 152. Claudio Ginocchi, Debt Collections on Behalf of Nonappropriated Fund 
Instrumentalities, ARMY LAW., Apr. 1991, at 2, 4 (“Alternate methods are not 
as quick and sure as an offset action, and they do not apply to every category 
of debtors.”); Mary N. Milne, Staking a Claim: A Guide for Establishing a Gov-
ernment Property Affirmative Claims Program, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2012, at 17, 
25 (“Administrative offset, also referred to as an involuntary collection, is a 
powerful method of enforcing collections. Under the Debt Collection Act of 
1982, the Army can withhold money payable by the United States to an indi-
vidual to satisfy a debt owed by that individual.”).  
 153. Waechter v. Amoco Prod. Co., 537 P.2d 228, 255 (Kan. 1975). 
 154. Cf. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit 
Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 379 (arguing that “the most important 
effect” of the 2005 bankruptcy reforms would be “to slow the time of inevitable 
filings by the deeply distressed, allowing [credit card] issuers to earn more 
revenues from these individuals before they file”). 
 155. Badawi, supra note 135, at 14.  
 156. Id. (“A second reason that the incentives of the creditor may diverge 
from those of broader society is that the creditor does not have to pay some or 
all of the costs of mistakes. This is a problem that has, thus far, received little 
attention in the literature on self-help law. Nevertheless, it is a concern be-
cause a creditor may mistakenly use self-help, and there is a cost to correcting 
those mistakes.”). 
 157. For a rare example of a case in which employees prevailed in a wrong-
ful recovery of an overpayment, see Leirer v. Caputo, 616 N.E.2d 147, 150 
(N.Y. 1993) (concluding “that statutory and common-law recoupment powers 
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mistakes makes the employee situation look more like self-help 
in the context of real property than personal property. Self-help 
is prohibited for debts secured by real property because, among 
other reasons, it is difficult to unwind a mistaken reposses-
sion.158 This similarity in the difficulty of correcting mistakes in 
real property repossession and recovering overpayments should 
caution against self-help in the context of employee overpay-
ments.  
Another risk with self-help remedies is that they prevent 
people from raising affirmative defenses that they could raise 
in court. This fact creates an incredibly large imbalance of pow-
er between the parties, even more so than already exist. For in-
stance, the statute of limitations for an employer’s cause of ac-
tion for unjust enrichment is only two years in some states.159 
Employers can fail to detect overpayments for longer than two 
years.160 Yet, if the employer simply withholds money from the 
employee’s paycheck, the employee will never have the oppor-
tunity to raise a statute of limitations defense. Employees 
probably do not know about the statute of limitations, making 
them less likely to challenge the withholding and more likely to 
agree to it.161 
 
of the County Comptroller do not extend to the unilateral design and execution 
of a wage withholding regime to recoup purported salary overpayments under 
circumstances such as these when the basis for and amounts of the overpay-
ments were never reduced to an established debt and when County Charter 
procedural rubrics have been ignored or bypassed”). 
 158. Badawi, supra note 135, at 4; see also id. at 18–19 (“There is also good 
reason to believe that landlords will not fully internalize the cost of the harm 
from the mistaken use of self-help because capturing the damages associated 
with a wrongful eviction can be quite difficult. To make this concept more con-
crete, imagine that a landlord uses self-help to evict a retailer and, after sev-
eral months of litigation, the retailer establishes that the eviction was improp-
er. To internalize properly the cost of the harm the landlord would, at a 
minimum, need to compensate the retailer for lost profits, lost goodwill, the 
costs of rehiring employees, and the costs of repairing supplier relationships. 
These types of costs can be quite difficult to measure and, insofar as landlords 
do not have to pay them, one can expect them to be more aggressive than soci-
ety would prefer when it comes to self-help.”). 
 159. HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Tex. 1998) (stat-
ing the statute of limitations for unjust enrichment claims is two years in Tex-
as). 
 160. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28 (“GAO’s anal-
ysis of DFAS data on military pay debts and Army investigations of potential 
fraud completed over the past 2 years identified numerous instances of the ef-
fect of errors or irregularities in Army active duty payroll disbursements that 
went undetected for lengthy periods of time, including some that were not de-
tected for up to 2 years or until the soldier left the Army.”). 
 161. Timothy E. Goldsmith & Nathalie Martin, Testing Materiality Under 
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The one place where the analogy between repossessions 
under Article 9 and setting off wages breaks down is the level 
of protection afforded to the party subject to the self-help reme-
dy. Under Article 9, a debtor can sue a secured creditor for 
damages if the creditor fails to follow Article 9’s guidelines on 
repossession,162 and if the property securing the loan was a con-
sumer good, the debtor “may recover for that failure in any 
event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus 10 
percent of the principal amount of the obligation or the time-
price differential plus 10 percent of the cash price.”163 The debt-
or in this final instance is entitled to recover even if the debtor 
did not suffer an injury from the secured creditor’s illicit con-
duct.164 Moreover, a well-informed debtor can almost always 
prevent self-help repossession by threatening violence because 
a creditor continuing to repossess under these circumstances is 
likely breaching the peace, so the repossession is illegal.165 On 
the other hand, even informed employees are powerless to pre-
vent self-help set-offs, and the best case scenario for the em-
ployee subject to wrongful wage withholding is that the em-
ployee will recover for the employer breaching its employment 
contract or for the tort of conversion. But, to recover, the em-
ployee needs an attorney, and it is unlikely that people who do 
not have enough money to live because their employer has 
withheld wages will have the money to pay a lawyer.166  
This lack of protection for the overpaid employee is re-
markable, given the level of protection for even a business 
debtor under Article 9. The next Part explores other potential 
laws that might protect employees and demonstrates how each 
fails to offer substantial safeguards for employees. 
 
the Unfair Practices Acts: What Information Matters When Collecting Time-
Barred Debts?, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP., Spring 2010, at 372, 380. For 
some situations, offsetting wages also allows the employer to avoid the statute 
of limitations altogether. See 31 U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1) (2012) (“Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, regulation, or administrative limitation, no limita-
tion on the period within which an offset may be initiated or taken pursuant to 
this section shall be effective.”). 
 162. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-625, 3 U.L.A. 736 (2010). 
 163. Id. § 9-625(c)(2). 
 164. See id. § 9-625(c) cmt. 4 (stating that § 9-625(c)(2) was “designed to 
ensure that every noncompliance with the requirements of Part 6 in a con-
sumer-goods transaction results in liability, regardless of any injury that may 
have resulted”). 
 165. Id. § 9-609(b).  
 166. Cf. Smetanka, supra note 26, at 1085 (“Hiring a lawyer, however, is 
virtually impossible in most cases since an overpaid benefits recipient is al-
ready in the minus column and can rarely afford representation.”). 
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III.  LAW’S FAILURE TO PROTECT OVERPAID 
EMPLOYEES   
Most unsecured creditors face a series of obstacles to col-
lecting debt. These obstacles ensure debtors are treated hu-
manely. They make collection more difficult and costly, but 
they reflect social concerns about fairness and decency in con-
sumer affairs. This Part describes the most common laws 
aimed at protecting debtors—the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act in Section A, bankruptcy law in Section B, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in Section C, and for the military, military wage 
deduction laws in Section D. As each of the following sections 
indicate, however, these common debtor protection laws have 
little effect on the collection activities of employers seeking to 
recoup overpayments.  
A. THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 
For most debtors, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA) offers important protections against abusive debt col-
lection by debt collection agencies.167 For instance, it forbids 
debt collectors from calling the debtor “at any unusual time or 
place or a time or place known or which should be known to be 
inconvenient to the consumer,”168 from contacting the debtor di-
rectly if the debtor is represented by an attorney,169 and from 
contacting the debtor at the debtor’s work if the collector knows 
the employer does not permit such calls.170 It also forbids the 
debt collector from harassing or abusing the debtor by, for in-
stance, using “obscene or profane language”171 or by calling the 
debtor repeatedly.172 Finally, it requires that debt collectors in-
form debtors of certain important rights.173  
Congress passed this statute because it concluded that 
“[t]here is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, 
and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors”174 
and that “[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these 
injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.”175 Before Con-
 
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012). 
 168. Id. § 1692c(a)(1). 
 169. Id. § 1692c(a)(2). 
 170. Id. § 1692c(a)(3). 
 171. Id. § 1692d(2). 
 172. Id. § 1692d(5). 
 173. Id. § 1692g. 
 174. Id. § 1692(a). 
 175. Id. § 1692(b). 
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gress enacted the FDCPA, “[i]t was not unusual for [debt collec-
tors] to make telephone calls at all hours of the night, issue 
threats to the consumer, or divulge a consumer’s confidential 
information to friends and neighbors, all in the quest to collect 
outstanding debts.”176 Abusive debt collection can have devas-
tating effects on the employee, even causing medical prob-
lems.177 Even more significantly from a public policy standpoint, 
it can create negative externalities by adversely affecting third 
parties completely unrelated to the employer/employee rela-
tionship, such as family members178 and the state.179 
There is substantial evidence that employers turn to debt 
collectors to recover overpayments from employees,180 especially 
if setting-off the employee’s wages is impossible for some rea-
son. Since numerous situations exist in which employers can-
not recover simply by deducting overpayments from an employ-
ee’s future wages, employers turn to debt collectors as a logical 
resource. The Department of Defense, for instance, uses debt 
collectors to recover overpayments from soldiers.181 In other 
 
 176. Elwin Griffith, Identifying Some Trouble Spots in the Fair Debt Collec-
tion Practices Act: A Framework for Improvement, 83 NEB. L. REV. 762, 763 
(2005). 
 177. Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 561 (2002). 
 178. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION 
OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 49–50 (2006). 
 179. Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 749, 788 (2008). 
 180. See, e.g., Daniel J. Chacon, Payroll Errors Near $200,000 a Year: City 
Taking Steps To Stop Overpaying Departing Workers, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS, June 11, 2008, at 8 (describing how Denver collected some overpay-
ments from employees directly but noting that “about $400,000 of overpay-
ments during the past five years were sent to collections . . .”); Ronnie Blair, 
Schools Stiffed for $108,829, TAMPA TRIBUNE (May 7, 2009), http://tbo.com/ 
news/education-news/2009/may/07/pa-schools-stiffed-for-108829-ar-91514/ (de-
scribing efforts to collect employee salary overpayments, including “telephone 
calls, letters and assistance from a collection agency”); John Woolfolk, Reserv-
ists’ Pay Debated, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 31, 2011, at 5 (“Changes 
since 2007 that give city officials quicker access to reservists’ military pay 
stubs have reduced errors. But Christian said one fellow officer and reservist 
earlier this year had a city-hired collection agency come after him to recoup 
overpayments despite the employee’s repeated attempts to reconcile the mat-
ter.”); Florin, supra note 39 (“Walter L. Edwards III of Niantic, who retired 
from the state Department of Correction on Jan. 1 after 20 years of service, 
was shocked to receive a letter saying he had been overpaid by the department 
and owed $1,255 . . . . Edwards said he was told his account would be sent to a 
collection agency if he did not repay the department within a month.”). 
 181. Paltrow & Carr, supra note 1 (“Former soldiers have had their civilian 
wages and their Veterans Administration benefits garnished. They have been 
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overpayment contexts, like Social Security, the government 
similarly turns to debt collectors to spur repayment.182 
We might expect the FDCPA to protect employees from the 
harms of abusive debt collection, but it does not. The Act only 
applies to the collection of “debt,” and debt “means any obliga-
tion or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising 
out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or 
services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes . . . .”183 One essen-
tial component of debt under the Act is that it must arise out of 
a transaction.184 Several federal appellate courts have held that 
a transaction means a consensual interaction.185 Under this 
 
pursued by private collection agencies and forced to pay tax penalties.”); Pay 
My Debt, DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE, http://www.dfas.mil/ 
debtandclaims/paymydebt/paymydebt.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (inform-
ing military personnel that they will be charged a $15 administrative fee for 
“[i]nitial referral to a private collection agency”); Ginocchi, supra note 152, at 4 
(footnotes omitted) (“31 U.S.C. section 3718 authorizes agencies to contract for 
debt collection services. Accordingly, DOD has informed all of its components 
that they could use commercial collection agencies for collection services to 
supplement their collection programs.”). 
 182. 31 U.S.C. § 3711(g)(4) (2006); Ben-Ishai et al., supra note 26, at 545 
(discussing “the range of collection options open to the Ontario government as 
it tries to collect debts owed to [provincial programs], options that include the 
reduction of benefit levels, referral to private collection agencies, court action 
and the set-off of tax refunds . . .”). 
 183. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“Back rent by its nature is an obligation that arises only from the tenant's 
failure to pay the amounts due under the contractual lease transaction. In this 
respect, back rent is much like the obligation arising out of a dishonored check 
where a service has been rendered or goods sold on the premise of immediate 
payment. The obligation to pay the bounced check, like the duty to pay back 
rent, does not derive from an extension of credit but rather because the payor 
breached its payment obligations in the contract between the parties.”); Beggs 
v. Rossi, 145 F.3d 511, 512 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that unpaid 
taxes do not constitute a debt); Ladick v. Van Gemert, 146 F.3d 1205, 1206–07 
(10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a condominium assessment is debt because it 
arises out of a consensual transaction—the purchase of the condominium); 
Duffy v. Landberg, 133 F.3d 1120, 1123–24 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that dis-
honored checks are debts within the FDCPA because they arose out of the 
purchase of goods, which is a consensual transaction); Hawthorne v. Mac Ad-
justments, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that payment 
obligations arising from negligent acts are not debts subject to the FDCPA be-
cause they do not arise out of a consumer transaction); Bass v. Stolper, 
Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1997) (de-
termining that the FDCPA’s legislative history clearly shows that Congress 
intended for consumer obligations paid by check to fall within the definition of 
“debt”); Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Grp., 834 F.2d 1163, 1168 (3d Cir. 1987) 
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gloss on the word transaction, mistaken overpayments do not 
qualify because no one voluntarily agrees to the interaction 
when both parties are making a mistake. 
A recent case from the Eastern District of New York illus-
trates this conclusion. In Orenbuch v. Leopold, Gross & 
Sommers, P.C., the court directly addressed a situation in 
which an accounting error caused an employer to overpay an 
employee.186 After noting that mistaken overpayments were not 
part of the FDCPA’s legislative history,187 the court dismissed 
the employee’s claim: “[T]his is not the type of debt contemplat-
ed by the FDCPA because the overpayment of salary was not a 
‘transaction’ within the meaning of the statute.”188 Because 
many state consumer debt protection laws use the exact same 
definition of debt,189 these state laws also do not likely offer 
overpaid employees any protection. 
If the employee signed an agreement to repay mistaken 
overpayments, then courts would likely consider the overpay-
ment to be a debt.190 Because restitution sets the default rule as 
one of repayment, however, many employers do not have this 
provision in their agreements.191 The result is that for many 
employees, debt collectors have few restraints on their con-
duct.192 
 
(holding that allegedly obtaining HBO illegally was not a debt because it did 
not arise out of a consensual transaction); Mabe v. G.C. Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 32 
F.3d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that child support payments are not debts 
because they arise from a parental duty and are imposed by the state); Staub 
v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the FDCPA does not 
apply to tax collections). For a detailed look at the case law, see Griffith, supra 
note 176, at 765–75. 
 186. Orenbuch v. Leopold, Gross & Sommers, P.C., 586 F. Supp. 2d 105, 
106 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 187. Id. at 107. 
 188. Id. at 108. For a similar analysis in which a court found that a bank 
overpaying a customer was not considered a debt, see Arnold v. Truemper, 833 
F. Supp. 678, 685–86 (N.D. Ill. 1993).  
 189. See, e.g., 32 ME. REV. STAT. § 11002 (2013) (using the FDCPA’s defini-
tion); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-14.9-3(4) (2013) (same). 
 190. See Oppenheim v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 627 F.3d 833, 838 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that a mistaken overpayment by PayPal to a user was a debt because 
the PayPal user agreement made the user fully liable for invalidated pay-
ments); Hoffman v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 3:08-CV-255, 2010 WL 9113645 
(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 3, 2010) (same). 
 191. See Smith v. Bear, Inc., 419 S.W.3d 49, 58 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013), review 
denied (Feb. 12, 2014). 
 192. Common law torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress 
or invasion of privacy, still apply, but Congress enacted the FDCPA precisely 
because these protections were inadequate to restrain debt collectors.  
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B. BANKRUPTCY 
The ultimate protection in American law for people who 
owe money is bankruptcy.193 Bankruptcy is valuable for indi-
viduals because the automatic stay stops all attempts to collect 
debts from the moment the individual files for bankruptcy.194 
Moreover, bankruptcy allows people to start fresh by discharg-
ing their debts.195 This fresh start can rehabilitate debtors be-
cause “1)  . . . discharge should (whether or not it does) serve a 
consumer education function; 2)  . . . discharge constitutes an 
emotional and psychological purgative for the debtor; and 3) 
 . . . discharge allows the debtor to resume active participation 
in the open credit economy.”196 Debtors who are freed from 
overwhelming debt are able to provide for those who depend on 
them because their income is not taken to service debt.197  
Yet, for many employees, bankruptcy is not a safeguard for 
liability stemming from their employers’ mistaken overpay-
ments. While it is true that some courts deem overpayments to 
be debts that are dischargeable in bankruptcy,198 many others 
do not, leaving employees liable to repay their employers even 
if they seek bankruptcy protection.199 The difference between 
 
 193. See Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 
98 GEO. L.J. 289, 291 (2010) (“Bankruptcy is not the cause of financial dis-
tress; it is our institutional remedy for it.”). 
 194. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
 195. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (citations omitted) (in-
ternal quotations omitted) (“This Court has certainly acknowledged that a 
central purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which certain insol-
vent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and 
enjoy a new opportunity in life . . . .”); Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 
U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915) (citations omitted) (recognizing that the purpose of 
bankruptcy is “to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive in-
debtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and re-
sponsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes”); Margaret Howard, A 
Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1047 
(1987) (“The purpose of the consumer bankruptcy system, effectuated by dis-
charge, is to give a fresh start . . . .”); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Pol-
icy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985) (“Discharge, the 
doctrine that frees the debtor’s future income from the chains of previous 
debts, lies at the heart of bankruptcy policy.”). 
 196. Howard, supra note 195, at 1059–60. 
 197. Jackson, supra note 195, at 1418–19. 
 198. See, e.g., In re Sterling, 479 B.R. 444, 447 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012) 
(finding that “debt owed to [the former employer] as a result of compensation 
overpayments” was dischargeable). 
 199. See Celi v. Trs. of Pipefitters Local 537 Pension Plan, No. 10-11152-
DJC, 2011 WL 5926669, at *7 (D. Mass. Nov. 28, 2011) (“Accordingly, the 
bankruptcy discharge order did not extinguish the Defendants’ right to recoup 
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these two outcomes lies in whether the court views the employ-
er’s action to recover overpayments from an employee’s wages 
as a set-off or a recoupment.200 If it is the former, the overpay-
ment is covered by the automatic stay and discharged through 
the bankruptcy, but if it is the latter, neither the automatic 
stay nor a discharge offer employees any protection.201 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a set-off occurs when a credi-
tor has a claim against the debtor and, as part of a separate 
transaction, the debtor has a claim against the creditor.202 Un-
der state law, a creditor in that situation can set-off the amount 
the debtor owes the creditor before the creditor pays anything 
to the debtor.203 In bankruptcy, however, a creditor can only re-
cover prepetition overpayments by a set-off from prepetition 
wages.204 In other words, all of the wages the employee earns 
after filing for bankruptcy are the debtor’s to keep free from the 
set-off from the debt the employee owed from before filing. If an 
employee files for bankruptcy and the court considers the set-
off rules to cover the over-payments, then the debt is dis-
charged in bankruptcy. 
 
the disability pension overpayments made to Celi under the Plan.”); Eissa v. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 09-1268-EFM, 2010 WL 4942131, at *4 (D. Kan. Nov. 
30, 2010) (holding that an insurer could recoup overpayments despite the in-
sured’s bankruptcy); cf. Kosadnar v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (In re Kosadnar), 157 
F.3d 1011, 1016 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that voluntary overpay-
ments of commissions were outside the purview of bankruptcy and thus an 
employer did not violate the automatic stay when it recouped the overpay-
ments from the employee’s paychecks after the employee declared bankrupt-
cy).  
 200. See Kosadnar, 157 F.3d at 1013 (“The disposition of this case depends 
on whether MetLife’s withholdings from Kosadnar’s pay are characterized as 
recoupment or setoff.”). 
 201. Slater Health Ctr., Inc. v. United States (In re Slater Health Ctr.), 398 
F.3d 98, 105 (1st Cir. 2005). See generally Marvin E. Sprouse III, Governmen-
tal Recoupment: An Equitable Remedy with an Equitable Result?, 26 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 12 (2007) (explaining the differences between set-off and re-
coupment through a series of cases involving overpayments by government 
entities). 
 202. Holford v. Powers (In re Holford), 896 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.1990). 
 203. Lawndale Steel Co. v. Magic Steel Co. (In re Lawndale Steel Co.), 155 
B.R. 990, 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 204. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion and in sections 362 and 363 of this title, this title does not affect any right 
of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of 
such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the 
case, except to the extent that . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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Many courts, however, treat recovering mistaken over-
payments as recoupments.205 Recoupment is an action to recov-
er a debt by reducing a payment due under and arising out of 
the same transaction.206 Such an action “allows a defendant to 
reduce the amount of a plaintiff’s claim by asserting a claim 
against the plaintiff which arose out of the same transaction to 
arrive at a just and proper liability on the plaintiff’s claim.”207 
The test for whether the creditor’s and the debtor’s claims 
against each other arise from the same contract or transaction 
is an equitable one.208 If the court characterizes the overpay-
ment as a recoupment, then the overpayment is not a debt un-
der the Bankruptcy Code at all. As one bankruptcy court ex-
plained: 
The term ‘debt’ is defined under the Bankruptcy Code as ‘liability on a 
claim.’ ‘Claim’ in turn is defined as a ‘right to payment . . . .’ The basis 
for [a creditor’s] argument that the overpayment does not constitute a 
debt is the premise that its deductions are a recoupment of the over-
payment . . . . Because recoupment only reduces a debt as opposed to 
constituting an independent basis for a debt, it is not a claim in bank-
ruptcy, and is therefore unaffected by the debtor’s discharge.209 
Because recoupment is not a debt under the Bankruptcy Code, 
the automatic stay and discharge provisions of the Code do not 
apply.210 
The connection between recoupment and restitution is 
plain. One formative case notes this link: 
Further, bankruptcy courts apply recoupment as an equitable doc-
trine. Here we face a question of unjust enrichment. The situation be-
fore us is not one in which the creditor seeking relief consciously 
 
 205. See, e.g., Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B & L Oil Co.), 782 
F.2d 155, 159 (10th Cir. 1986); Sheppard v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals 
Comm’n, 492 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Gen. Accident Ins. Co. 
v. Yaglowski, 188 A.D.2d 1032, 1032 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
 206. See In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 107 B.R. 441, 444 (Bankr. D.N.H. 
1989). 
 207. U.S. Abatement Corp. v. Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. (In 
re U.S. Abatement Corp.), 79 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 208. See Malinowski v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor (In re Malinowski), 156 
F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating the 
test is whether “both debts . . . arise out of a single integrated transaction so 
that it would be inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of that transac-
tion without also meeting its obligations”); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Gullett, 253 B.R. 
796, 804 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has not stated a test so 
that courts can consider “the facts and equities of each case”). 
 209. In re Delicruz, 300 B.R. 669, 679–80 (Bnkr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (internal 
quotations marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
 210. Id. at 683–84. 
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made a loan, extended credit, or made payments required by a con-
tract, as did the bankrupt’s ordinary creditors. Ashland paid the sums 
to B & L by mistake. Although common sharing may be required in 
some mistake cases by the bankruptcy laws’ cleavage rules, allowing 
B & L’s other creditors to share in this money would give them a 
windfall, a classic case of unjust enrichment.211 
Thus, the very doctrine of restitution that enables employers to 
recover overpayments will cause many bankruptcy courts to 
consider withholding wages from the employee to be recoup-
ment, not subject to bankruptcy protection.212 
Even if the court does categorize an overpayment as a set-
off and not a recoupment, the debt still may be excepted from 
the employee’s discharge if the employee kept the overpayment 
intentionally. If the employee knew about the overpayment but 
purposefully retained it, an employer could argue that 
§ 523(a)(6) makes the debt nondischargeable because the debt 
was “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another 
entity or to the property of another entity.”213 Thus, even em-
ployees who fit the overpayment into the set-off category could 
find the debt is nondischargeable.214 Whether it is because 
withholding wages is recoupment or because the debt is 
nondischargeable, the end result is the same—an employee is 
 
 211. Ashland Petroleum Co., 782 F.2d at 159. For an excellent extended 
consideration of the connection between restitution and recoupment, see 
Centergas, Inc. v. Conoco Inc. (In re Centergas, Inc.), 172 B.R. 844, 848–52 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994) (“A review of the cases dealing with the doctrine of 
recoupment shows a common theme running through them: There were ad-
vance payments or overpayments made to the debtor which, if kept by the 
debtor, constituted unjust enrichment.”). 
 212. Cf. Mullen v. United States, 696 F.2d 470, 472 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding 
that, despite the fact the debtor had filed for bankruptcy, the Air Force could 
withhold money from a service member’s retirement benefits because he had 
received a $15,000 payment that had to be repaid for him to be eligible for re-
tirement benefits and the Air Force’s withholding was merely a recoupment); 
In re Ruiz, 146 B.R. 877, 877 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992) (permitting an employer 
to withhold postpetition commissions to recoup advance commissions paid 
prepetition); Cont’l Cas. Co., 253 B.R. at 804 (“The circumstances in the case 
at bar reveal that Continental’s efforts to obtain the $8,619.54 it had overpaid 
Gullett were acts of recoupment. Continental overpaid Gullett TIB totaling 
$8,619.54 under a workers’ compensation insurance policy. At the time Conti-
nental took the actions in issue concerning the $8,619.54, Gullett was assert-
ing a claim against Continental for impairment income benefits under the 
same workers’ compensation policy. Both obligations arose out of Continental’s 
insurance contract.”). 
 213. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012). 
 214. Cf. In re Hayes, Nos. BK10–43784–TJM, A11–4015–TJM, 2011 WL 
4352315, at *5 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sep 16, 2011) (finding a debt to workers com-
pensation was nondischargeable because the debtor caused the overpayment 
by putting in the wrong employment numbers on a form). 
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left without the basic protection bankruptcy affords to debtors 
in extreme financial distress.  
C. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 
Employers do not have to worry about wage garnishment 
laws because they are not setting-off wages pursuant to a legal 
or equitable proceeding,215 nor are they creditors collecting 
debts from assets in the possession of a third party.216 But, the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)217 does apply to many 
employees and potentially offers them minimal protections 
against employers withholding money from their wages.218  
The FLSA forbids employers covered by the Act from pay-
ing employees covered by the Act less than the minimum 
wage,219 even if the employee agrees to the lower payment.220 
Thus, just based on the face of the FLSA, such an employer 
cannot withhold wages that would render the payment below 
$7.25 an hour.221 The FLSA might also protect overtime pay due 
to an employee from withholding,222 but the rule’s application in 
this context is less clear. In some Circuits, courts have held 
that the FLSA prohibits employers from offsetting mistaken 
overpayments from overtime wages due under the statute,223 
but other Circuits permit set-offs. The Fifth Circuit has held, 
for instance, that if an employer has paid wages in advance of 
when they are due, the employer does not have to pay the over-
 
 215. See 15 U.S.C. § 1672(c) (2012) (“The term ‘garnishment’ means any 
legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are 
required to be withheld for payment of any debt.”). 
 216. See Fidel Rodriguez, Jr. & Manuel C. Maltos, Attorney’s Fees and 
Judgments, 54 ADVOC. (TEX.) 5, 8 (2011) (“A garnishment action is against a 
third party who is in possession of money or property of the debtor or is owed 
money by the debtor.”). 
 217. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
 218. Additionally, several states have laws that protect employees from 
withholding. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 193 (2009); THOMAS E. GEIDT & JUDITH 
M. KLINE, CAL. BUS. LAW DESKBOOK § 16:18. 
 219. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 
 220. See Brennan v. Veterans Cleaning Serv., Inc., 482 F.2d 1362, 1370 
(5th Cir. 1973) (“It has long been recognized that the protection afforded by 
the Fair Labor Standards Act may not be waived by agreement between em-
ployer and employee.”). 
 221. See Wage and Hour Division, Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 222. See 29 U.S.C. § 207. 
 223. See Herman v. Fabri-Centers of Am., Inc., 308 F.3d 580, 591 (6th Cir. 
2002) (limiting overpayments to offset only overtime wages due during the 
same period, not different pay periods). 
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time wages as required by the FLSA but instead can set-off the 
amount already paid.224 Even more limiting, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor issued on opinion letter along these same lines, 
but it stated that an employer could deduct wages to recover an 
overpayment even if it caused the employee to go below the 
minimum wage.225 Although the opinion only covers the facts 
presented in the question to the Department of Labor, it might 
signal that the Department does not believe employers recoup-
ing overpayments have to pay the minimum wage at all.  
Even in the jurisdictions with the most expansive view, the 
FLSA’s protections are very limited and not applicable to all 
employees. First, the only guarantees are payment of the min-
imum wage and potentially overtime, which most likely is not 
enough to support an employee’s financial obligations.226 It does 
not assure the employee will get any money above minimum 
wage.227 Second, the Act does not apply to some types of em-
ployees, including employees in “executive, administrative, or 
 
 224. See Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 824 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that overpayments made in error to firefighters could offset underpayments 
from subsequent pay periods); Goulas v. LaGreca, No. 12-898, 2013 WL 
2477030, at *10 n.3 (E.D. La. June 7, 2013) (“In the instant case, Services 
seeks to offset the overtime wages it owes to Goulas with other wages it actu-
ally paid to Goulas. This is clearly permissible under Singer and is not fore-
closed by Martin.”). 
 225. Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
FLSA2004-19NA (Oct. 8, 2004), http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSANA/ 
2004/2004_10_08_19FLSA_NA_recoup.pdf (“It has been our longstanding posi-
tion that where an employer makes a loan or an advance of wages to an em-
ployee, the principal may be deducted from the employee’s earnings even if 
such deduction cuts into the minimum wage or overtime pay due the employee 
under the FLSA. . . . Thus the amount the department chooses to recoup in the 
next pay period is at the department’s discretion. It does not matter whether 
the deduction was made in the next pay period or several pay periods later.”). 
 226.  See Sarah Leberstein & Anastasia Christman, Occupy Our Occupa-
tions: Why “We Are the 99%” Resonates with Working People and What We Can 
Do To Fix the American Workplace, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1073, 1095 (2012) 
(“A full-time worker earning $7.25 an hour brings home about $15,000 a year, 
barely above the federal poverty line for a family of two people. Unfortunately, 
the federal minimum wage has fallen far below its historic value; currently it 
is $7.25 per hour and would have to be set at over $10 per hour to achieve the 
value it held in 1968.” (footnote omitted)). See generally BARBARA 
EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001) 
(documenting the experience of a woman attempting to survive on minimum 
wage).  
 227. See Lopez v. Tri-State Drywall, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (E.D. 
Pa. 2012). The employee is entitled to the full amount the contract promises 
the employee if the employee must be paid for overtime. Hayes v. Bill Haley & 
His Comets, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 34, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1967). But, for jurisdictions al-
lowing set-offs, the outcome is unclear. 
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professional capacity.”228 Because employers initially determine 
who counts as an exempt employee and may not comply with 
the law in making this determination, the Act is 
underenforced.229 Third, in the context of the case study I pre-
sented in Part I, some military personnel are not covered by the 
FLSA at all. Military personnel serving outside of the United 
States are not under the FLSA because the FLSA only governs 
“among the several States or between any State and any place 
outside thereof”230 and not foreign military bases, for instance.231 
Furthermore, the military activity (done by soldiers or civil-
ians) of prosecuting war is not covered by the FLSA because it 
is not “commerce” as required by the Act.232 
Finally, and most importantly, the FLSA does not prevent 
the employer from collecting the debt in ways other than with-
holding wages. The employer can still contact the employee and 
demand immediate and full repayment, and it can still hire 
debt collectors, engendering the problems discussed in subpart 
III.A. The only possible limit is on the self-help remedy of with-
holding wages. 
D. MILITARY WAGE PERIODIC DEDUCTIONS 
For military personnel, 5 U.S.C. § 5514 specifically author-
izes withholding wages periodically, but it limits the amount 
 
 228. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012). For a discussion of how the exemptions 
have increased over time, see Leberstein & Christman, supra note 226, at 
1095 (“[F]ast-growing low-wage jobs like home care continue to be excluded 
from the Fair Labor Standards Act by overbroad U.S. DOL regulations, ren-
dering 2.5 million workers ineligible for basic protections like the minimum 
wage and overtime pay. Furthermore, in recognition of changes in our econo-
my and the increasing prevalence of low-wage jobs, lawmakers need to repeal 
or narrow exclusions in minimum wage and overtime standards that have 
driven down standards in key sectors such as agriculture, domestic and home 
care work, and food service.” (footnote omitted)). 
 229. Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-
Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2317 (1998) 
(“[E]nforcement of the upper-level exemptions requires individual employees 
to come forward and demand that they no longer be categorized as exempt—a 
change that is still experienced as a status loss.”). 
 230. 29 U.S.C. § 203(b). 
 231. See Filardo v. Foley Bros., 45 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943) 
(interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act as inapplicable to employees at a 
defense base in Iran). 
 232. See Barksdale v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 690, 695 (E.D. 
Ark. 1947) (“Nor do we think that the term ‘commerce’ as used in said phrase 
[in the FLSA] can logically be construed to include a shipment across state 
lines by the Government to its military facilities of Government-owned muni-
tions of war to be used in the prosecution of the war.”).  
HAWKINS_4FMT 11/3/2014 4:44 PM 
130 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:89 
 
that can be withheld unless the employee agrees to a higher 
level.233 It states: “The amount deducted for any period may not 
exceed 15 percent of disposable pay, except that a greater per-
centage may be deducted upon the written consent of the indi-
vidual involved.”234 Additionally, the statute requires the gov-
ernment to give notice to the employee, provide records related 
to the debt, and have a hearing.235 Also, if offsetting fifteen per-
cent of an employee’s wages will cause “extreme financial hard-
ship,”236 the government cannot withhold the funds.237 Finally, 
the government can waive the collection of the debt if “the col-
lection of [a debt created by overpayment] would be against eq-
uity and good conscience and not in the best interests of the 
United States,”238 so employees have the potential for their 
overpayment debt to be waived.  
The problem with these protections is that, as the statute 
states, members of the military can waive the protections, and 
reports suggest these sorts of waivers occur routinely.239 The 
 
 233. 5 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1) (2012) (“When the head of an agency or his de-
signee determines that an employee, member of the Armed Forces or Reserve 
of the Armed Forces, is indebted to the United States for debts to which the 
United States is entitled to be repaid at the time of the determination by the 
head of an agency or his designee, or is notified of such a debt by the head of 
another agency or his designee the amount of indebtedness may be collected in 
monthly installments, or at officially established pay intervals, by deduction 
from the current pay account of the individual.”). The implementing regulation 
is 31 C.F.R. § 285.7(a)(1) (2012). In some cases, the government must use 37 
U.S.C. § 1007 (2012) to deduct wages. 
 234. 5 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1). 
 235. Id. § 5514(a)(2). 
 236. 34 C.F.R. § 31.8(b). 
 237. For an explanation of the rules implementing 5 U.S.C. § 5514 regard-
ing extreme financial hardship, see Sibley v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 913 F. Supp. 
1181, 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“We first address the merits of the ALJ’s rejection 
of the plaintiff’s claim that a 15% offset would cause ‘extreme financial hard-
ship.’ 34 C.F.R. § 31.8(b). Section 31.8(b)(1), promulgated pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 
§ 5514(b)(1), explains that an employee would suffer ‘extreme financial hard-
ship’ if the offset ‘would prevent the employee from meeting the costs neces-
sarily incurred for essential subsistence expenses.’ Section 31.8(b)(2) in turn 
defines ‘essential subsistence expenses’ as the costs of ‘food, housing, clothing, 
essential transportation and medical care.’ In addition, a relevant factor in de-
termining the existence of extreme financial hardship is whether the expenses 
‘have been minimized to the greatest extent possible.’ § 31.8(b)(3)(iii).”). 
 238. 5 U.S.C. § 5584(a). 
 239. U.S. Army Claims Serv., Collection of Debts and Overpayments from 
Claimants Using IRS Tax Offset Procedures, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1991, at 41 
(“Moreover, all claimants who receive funds from the government, regardless 
of employment status, are further vulnerable to involuntary collection. Specifi-
cally, by signing the DD Form 1842, each claimant has expressly authorized 
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protection afforded by the notice is even more ephemeral be-
cause if the mistaken payment really did belong to the govern-
ment, then failing to give notice is a harmless error.240 Similar-
ly, the right to inspect the records relating to the debt does not 
give the employee a private cause of action, undermining its 
utility.241 Finally, the provision permitting the government to 
waive the right to the debt is of little comfort because even if its 
conditions are completely met, the decision-maker still has dis-
cretion not to grant a waiver. Because the statute uses the 
word “may,” nothing can compel a waiver of the debt.242 The fact 
that numerous stories report high levels of withholding demon-
strates the facile nature of this protection.243 
In each of these cases, traditional debtor laws and em-
ployment laws that we would expect to apply to mistakenly 
overpaid employees turn out to offer little or no protection. 
While years of consumer advocacy have resulted in laws that 
protect borrowers with unsecured debts, the law has failed to 
offer minimal safeguards to employees suffering from financial 
 
the government to withhold his or her pay for any overcompensation which the 
claimant may receive because of subrogated payments by insurers, carriers or 
any other persons, or because of any information that the claimant has pro-
vided to the government that the government later discovers to be untrue.”). 
Outside the context of government employees, payroll professionals suggest 
that employers have employees sign waivers to enable them to withhold wages 
to obviate state wage laws. See Howard Perlman, Recovering Wage Overpay-
ments: Navigating the Maze of Compliance, BLOOMBERG BNA, http:// 
info.bna.com/apa/document.aspx?ID=195525 (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (“In 
general, acquiring employees’ written authorization can help employers defend 
the legality of the deductions, [Barbara Youngman, CPP, payroll manager 
with Southwest Airlines] said.”). 
 240. See McCarron v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 616, 621 (2008) (“Because 
plaintiff does not allege that she is entitled to the $10,800.00 in overpaid wag-
es, the Government’s failure to follow procedures in 5 U.S.C. § 5514 would 
constitute a harmless error, and any damages incurred as a consequence of 
this error would be de minimis.”).  
 241. See Roby-Wilson v. Potter, No. 01-3871, 2002 WL 32348831, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2002) (“The next count of plaintiff’s amended complaint al-
leges that the Postal Service violated 5 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(2) by failing to supply 
for inspection and copying its records relating to the purported debt, and that 
she incurred legal fees and other out-of-pocket losses as a result. The statute 
does not create a separate, private right of action for violation of this provi-
sion . . . .”). 
 242. Lawrence v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 550, 555–56 (2006).  
 243. See 155 CONG. REC. E1355-01 (daily ed. June 9, 2009) (statement of 
Rep. Carol Shea-Porter) (describing two-thirds of a National Guard Sergeant’s 
pay being deducted to pay back a mistaken overpayment); Paltrow & Carr, su-
pra note 1 (reporting a soldier’s pay was cut from $3,300 a month to $117.99 to 
recover an overpayment). 
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distress. This absence of meaningful protection requires judi-
cial or legislative action.  
IV.  FULFILLING LAW’S PROMISE TO PROTECT 
EMPLOYEES FROM ABUSIVE COLLECTION   
This Part outlines two paths that the law should take to 
protect employees from abusive collection methods by employ-
ers for mistaken wage overpayments. The first suggests ways 
for common law courts to reshape restitution doctrine to protect 
employees. The second offers a simple legislative fix to the 
problem that would eliminate the incongruity in current law 
that puts employees in such a vulnerable position relative to 
other debtors. Specifically, legislation should define wage over-
payments as unsecured loans for collection purposes and should 
forbid employers from setting-off overpayments from an em-
ployee’s wages without judicial involvement.  
A. JUDICIAL REFORMS OF RESTITUTION LAW  
One modest change courts could make to restitution law is 
to expand the change of position defense to include expendi-
tures for ordinary living expenses. While the predominate view 
currently is that the recipient of funds must make an extraor-
dinary purchase to qualify for the change of position defense,244 
courts should recognize that many, if not most, people spend 
whatever money they make. Thus, mistakenly overpaying 
someone and causing them to spend more money is a detri-
mental change of position for individuals. 
Most people do not have a personal budget that limits their 
purchasing decisions in any specific way.245 Instead, they live 
paycheck-to-paycheck, spending virtually all of the money in 
their bank accounts each pay period.246 As one financial planner 
 
 244. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 65 cmt. c (2010). 
 245. See Anthony Keane, Income Is the Vital Asset To Generate Wealth, 
COURIER MAIL (Austl.), June 16, 2008 (“95 per cent of people do not budget.”); 
Crystal Wylie, Workshops Offered To ‘Help Stuff Your Wallet,’ RICH. REG. (Ky.) 
(Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.richmondregister.com/news/local_news/article_ 
3400c240-c727-52f6-8630-0baffd6cadb2.html (“‘The majority of people do not 
budget, although more than 70 percent of consumers live paycheck to 
paycheck,’ [Harvey R. Little Jr., a certified financial planner] said. It is esti-
mated that only 39 percent of adults have enough money in cash or savings to 
cover three months of living expenses, he said.”).  
 246. See Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned 
Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
HAWKINS_4FMT 11/3/2014 4:44 PM 
2014] LAW’S REMARKABLE FAILURE 133 
 
observed, “‘Most people do not budget in a theoretical way, 
where they sit down and sort of write everything down. In-
stead, they budget intuitively against the cash in the bank. 
They sort of intuitively know when it’s low and restrain their 
spending . . . .’”247 When such individuals are overpaid, they ad-
just the amount they spend to reflect their income.248 In that 
way, they detrimentally change their position because of the 
overpayment. 
Some courts have already held that spending money for 
regular expenses counts as a changed position. In one example 
where a welfare receipt was mistakenly overpaid benefits, the 
court found “from the record it is undisputed that the monies 
received have been spent for rent, groceries, food, gas, electric, 
phone and other essentials by Garber; therefore, Garber has 
changed his position and has disbursed the money . . . .”249 Even 
 
515, 545 (2013) (“Most of these [low-income] families live paycheck to 
paycheck, making just enough (or in many cases not enough) to pay their bills, 
keep their apartments, and provide basic necessities for their children.”); 
Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Ci-
vilians from Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649, 698 (2012) (“[T]he 
majority of Americans live paycheck to paycheck . . . .”); Annamaria Lusardi, 
Daniel J. Schneider & Peter Tufano, Financially Fragile Households: Evidence 
and Implications 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
17072, 2011), http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/lusardi.pdf (“Using this 
$2,000/30 day metric of financial fragility, we find widespread financial weak-
ness in America: one quarter of Americans report that they certainly could not 
come up with the funds needed to cope with such a shock within thirty days, 
and an additional 19% would cope at least in part by selling or pawning pos-
sessions or taking payday loans. Adopting a broader definition of financial fra-
gility, we find that almost half of all households report that they certainly not 
or could probably not come up with funds to deal with an ordinary financial 
shock of this size. We examine the cross-sectional distribution of financial fra-
gility and we show that it is not just a poor person’s problem: a material frac-
tion of the solidly middle class is pessimistic about their ability to come up 
with $2,000 in a month.”).  
 247. Chris O’Malley, Budgeting for Household Expenses Remains Im-
portant To Increase Savings, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Mar. 12, 2001) (quoting 
John Guy, president of Wealth Planning & Management in Indianapolis). 
 248. Cf. Valerius, supra note 63, at 439 (“These recoupment practices have 
devastating financial consequences because by the time that the retirees are 
notified that their pension payments will be reduced, the retiree has already 
reasonably planned his expenses around the set amount he has been receiv-
ing.”). 
 249. State ex rel. Steger v. Garber, No. L-79-031, 1979 WL 207282, at *4 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (per curium); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Cent. Nat. Bank of Cleveland, 112 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1953) (“Where, after 
a payment under mistake of fact, the payee in good faith changes his position 
so that he no longer has possession of the money or will be in a worse condi-
tion if he is required to refund it than if the payer had refused to pay, to such 
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a case from centuries ago accounted for actual budgeting and 
spending practices of overpaid workers. In the old English case, 
Skyring v. Greenwood, the paymaster of a military corps mis-
takenly increased a soldier’s pay for several years and even 
continued to overpay the soldier after being notified of the prob-
lem.250 The court held that “it was not competent to the pay-
master to retain any of such sums of money on account of the 
sums which they had credited him for by way of increased pay, 
and which they had allowed him to consider his own for so long 
a period of time.”251 Part of the rationale for the decision was 
the reality that people spend the money they earn, and after 
spending the money, the soldier had changed his position:  
He who receives it has a right to consider it as his without dispute: he 
spends it in confidence that it is his . . . . He who receives it is not in 
the same condition: he has spent it in the confidence it was his, and 
perhaps has no means of repayment. . . . 
  It is of great importance to any man, and certainly not less to mili-
tary men than others, that they should not be led to suppose that 
their annual income is greater than it really is. Every prudent man 
accommodates his mode of living to what he supposes to be his in-
come; it therefore works a great prejudice to any man [that] he may 
be called upon to pay them back.252 
The idea that individuals who are overpaid do not change their 
position by essentially unknowingly taking on a debt to their 
employers is completely divorced from reality for the vast ma-
jority of individuals affected by mistaken overpayments. It is 
time that courts protect workers through adapting the change 
of position defense in the case of overpaid employees. 
The idea that the law of restitution should adapt to assure 
justice is not particularly revolutionary. Indeed, restitution it-
self developed to address the injustice caused by legal rules in 
specific situations.253 While the Third Restatement of Restitu-
tion presents restitution as primarily a set of legal rules and 
not “a free-floating moral inquiry,”254 a formalistic approach to 
restitution is inappropriate in unconventional situations such 
 
extent the payee is exonerated from repayment.”). 
 250. Skyring v. Greenwood, [1825] 107 Eng. Rep. 1064 (K.B.) 1064. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 1066–67 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 253. Laycock, supra note 83, at 1278 (“Restitution arose to avoid unjust re-
sults in specific cases—as a series of innovations to fill gaps in the rest of the 
law. Consequently, any definition of restitution risks the self-conscious circu-
larity of Maitland’s definition of equity: restitution consists of those rules that 
originated in writs and equitable remedies that lawyers think of as 
restitutionary.”). 
 254. Laycock, supra note 25, at 932. 
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as this one, where low-income workers are being overpaid be-
cause of sophisticated businesses’ negligence. As Peter Linzer 
has argued, for cases outside of conventional categories, “there 
is no way to avoid the question of justice—including fault—in 
deciding whether an enrichment (or impoverishment) is or is 
not unjust. In deciding on the basis of rough justice, it is neces-
sary to look closely at the facts.”255  
Some courts are already sympathetic to Linzer’s point.256 
For instance, in Lincoln National Life Insurance Company v. 
Rittman, in which the court held that the insurance company 
could not recover in restitution, the court discussed the change 
of position defense, but it also concluded that restitution was 
inappropriate for a more general reason: it would be inequita-
ble. The court argued:  
  There is yet a deeper reason for denying the restitutionary claim. 
We simply do not think recovery would be equitable under the cir-
cumstances. That, after all, remains the test. Perhaps this approach 
lacks analytical rigor, but it was precisely a scrupulous adherence to 
rigor that resulted in the growth of the courts of equity in the first 
place. While we do not deprecate the logic of appellant’s legal position, 
there sometimes arise cases where law goes only so far and the chan-
cellor must step in.257 
Because in many instances recovery of a mistaken overpay-
ment would cause employees substantial hardship, courts 
should assure rough justice and adapt the change of position 
defense for employees.258 Courts will already consider the 
 
 255. Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, 
Contracts and Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695, 774. 
 256. Even in the context of recoupments in bankruptcy, courts have recog-
nized the hardship that recovering overpayments can cause and suggest that 
equity should prevent recoupment. See In re Ross, 104 B.R. 171, 174 (E.D. Mo. 
1989) (recognizing “the hardship that could occur when an unemployed bank-
rupt would have to forego this sole subsistence as a penalty for receiving ex-
cess payments for earlier claims” and suggesting that “[e]quity demands some 
compromise”). 
 257. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Rittman, 790 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App. 
1990). 
 258. Even the Restatement itself appears open to the possibility courts 
might adapt the change of position defense for specific circumstances:  
  Particularly after substantial time has elapsed, a court may con-
clude that the imposition of a present obligation to repay money long 
since spent would be inequitable to the recipient, if circumstances 
make it impossible to restore the parties to the positions they would 
have occupied but for the claimant’s mistake. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 65 cmt. c. 
(2010). 
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payor’s negligence as one factor in their equitable inquiry,259 
further justifying this shift in the approach to the change of po-
sition defense.  
One argument against my move to expand the defense, 
however, has been advanced by some commentary that sug-
gests that a broad changed circumstances defense incentivizes 
recipients to quickly spend overpayments.260 As one article ar-
gues, “From a policy perspective, allowing a payee’s dissipation 
of proceeds as a defense to repayment creates an incentive for 
the recipient of mistakenly paid funds to spend the money—
and that is not an incentive most courts want to create.”261 The 
problem with this argument, however, is that it assumes people 
who receive funds will know they do not have a right to the 
funds. If that were the case, they would be ineligible for the 
change of position defense in the first place.262 And, the law 
cannot influence people who are unaware of the overpayment, 
because such people will not be thinking about the law at all. 
Thus, for courts concerned with employers’ collection efforts, 
the change of position defense offers a way to alter the legal 
landscape in favor of employees. 
But, merely denying an employer the right to recover in 
restitution will not ultimately solve the problem. If employers 
cannot recover for overpayments through restitution, they will 
contract in advance for the right to recover. As Saul Levmore 
notes, “[t]he decision to deny restitution can thus be seen as a 
means of encouraging the party most in control, the provider, to 
enter bargains in which the price of his provision is explicitly 
determined.”263 Indeed, when courts are reluctant to grant res-
titution for overpayments, pro-employer commentary suggests 
that employers include rights to repayment in contracts.264 
Thus, to police employers’ aggressive, unhindered collection 
techniques, legislative action is required. 
 
 259. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lone Star Producing Co., 322 F.2d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 
1963) (“The fact that the payor was negligent, or was carelessly ignorant of the 
facts as to which he was mistaken does not necessarily bar recovery, but may 
be considered in determining the equities between the parties and may reduce 
the amount of recovery.”). 
 260. Hafer & Mathis, supra note 39, at 95. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 84–105. 
 263. Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 72 (1985).  
 264. Stanton, supra note 150, at 490–91. 
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B. SIMPLE LEGISLATIVE FIX 
Commentators on overpayments in other contexts have of-
fered elaborate statutory solutions to balance the rights of the 
party overpaying and those being overpaid, suggesting limits 
on set-offs from future payments265 or new standards for equi-
table estoppel.266 Some states and other jurisdictions already of-
fer more comprehensive protections to employees who are mis-
takenly overpaid.267 And, in state benefit programs, “a 
significant portion of states look at the twin concerns of fault 
and recipient need or situation in determining whether unem-
ployment payments will be recouped from future benefits.”268  
Instead of a new framework for overpayments to employ-
ees, I propose a simple shift. Congress should require that em-
ployer overpayments are treated like any other unsecured loan 
for all federal and state collection purposes, and it should pro-
hibit employers from setting-off overpayments from an employ-
ee’s wages. Treating overpayments like an unsecured debt 
would mean that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and 
similar state laws applied to overpayments, it would put em-
ployers in the same pool as other unsecured creditors in bank-
ruptcy and would extinguish overpayment debt through a dis-
charge, and it would ensure employers did not withhold wages 
with or without the consent of the employee by removing the 
 
 265. Valerius, supra note 63, at 446–47. 
 266. McGonigle, supra note 26, at 630–31. 
 267. In California, the general rule is that an employer cannot withhold 
wages to offset debts the employee owes the employer. See, e.g., Morse v. Ser-
viceMaster Global Holdings Inc., No. C 10-00628 SI, 2011 WL 2470252, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (“To allow an employer to offset against wages for debts an 
employee may owe the employer would allow the employer to do by self-help 
what he cannot accomplish by attachment, and thus it would defeat the public 
policy of the attachment exemption for wages. It does not matter whether the 
employee owes the employer money to pay back a promissory note, to pay for a 
training where he failed to stay on the job for the requisite amount of time, or 
simply because the employer made a mistake and overpaid the employee one 
month.” (internal citations omitted)). But, this protection is easily avoided by 
employers, because the employee can consent to withholding. See THOMAS E. 
GEIDT & JUDITH M. KLINE, CAL. BUS. LAW DESKBOOK § 16:18 (“Even though 
the recoupment of overpayments or debts arguably benefits the employer, the 
DLSE has taken the enforcement position that employers may make a deduc-
tion to recover an overpayment, debt, vacation advance, or other amount owed 
to the employer if the employee has first voluntarily signed a written authori-
zation to permit the deduction—whether as a one-time deduction or a series of 
installments—provided that the amount deducted does not exceed the amount 
authorized and the deduction does not have the effect of reducing the employ-
ee’s pay below the minimum wage.”). 
 268. Failinger, supra note 26, at 109. 
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self-help remedy of offsetting wages. Because the legal frame-
work is already set up in great detail, designating overpay-
ments as unsecured debts is relatively inexpensive from both a 
legislative and a legal/business strategy standpoint.  
Changing the status of mistaken overpayments to purely 
unsecured debt by eliminating special collection rights makes 
sense, because the traditional justifications for secured credi-
tors having superior collection rights do not hold true in the 
context of mistakenly overpaid employees. As Part III points 
out, unsecured creditors face obstacles to collecting debts, such 
as (i) debt collection laws, (ii) the potential of bankruptcy, and 
(iii) the need to file a lawsuit, obtain a judgment, and execute 
that judgment before getting paid.269 Employers recouping 
overpaid wages do not face any of these barriers. Under Article 
9, secured creditors similarly have superior collection rights 
compared to unsecured creditors, because they can repossess 
specific collateral,270 but these rights are defensible because the 
debtor acquires corresponding benefits. The debtor benefits 
from the security interest by obtaining lower interest rates and 
access to credit because the secured creditor passes on some of 
the benefits of its ability to obtain repayment.271 On the other 
hand, because mistaken overpayments occur involuntarily for 
all parties, employees do not obtain a corresponding benefit. 
The employee who is overpaid by mistake does not, for in-
stance, get more money from the employer because the employ-
er can collect more easily. Even if we wanted to allow wage as-
signments to incentivize lenders to extend credit to consumers 
and to decrease the cost of credit,272 the rationale does not apply 
in the involuntary overpayment context.  
Another important policy within commercial law also justi-
fies eliminating employers’ special collection rights. Within the 
context of an insolvent debtor, set-offs redistribute the employ-
ee’s assets to the employer at the expense of the employee’s 
other creditors, undermining bankruptcy’s fundamental goal of 
creditor equality.273 If employees cannot pay all of their credi-
tors, the right to a set-off means that the employer will get paid 
 
 269. Supra Part III. 
 270. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-609(a)(1), 3 U.L.A. 671 (2010). 
 271. Mann, supra note 143, at 667. 
 272. Jonathan Riley Key, Note, Misguided Paternalism: The U.C.C. and 
FTC’s Attempt To Limit Wage Assignments, 62 ALA. L. REV. 823, 832 (2011). 
 273. Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (“Equality of distribution among 
creditors is a central policy of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
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100% of its claim, leaving the other creditors with no rights to 
the wages.274 The employer’s superior position is, as Judge Pos-
ner argues, “fortuitous . . . and therefore arbitrary.”275 Loans se-
cured by collateral also ensure the secured creditor is paid be-
fore unsecured creditors, disrupting creditor equality, but this 
disruption only occurs when the creditor has perfected its in-
terest and thereby warned the world of its superior interest.276 
The employer, on the other hand, has done nothing to justify its 
superior position over other creditors. Thus, reducing overpay-
ment debts to normal unsecured debts and disallowing set-offs 
reflect the principles underlying secured credit and bankruptcy 
law and theory. 
In my proposal, employers could still seek to recover over-
payments. In jurisdictions that do not allow set-offs now, em-
ployers pursue overpayments through lawsuits: “Where no such 
agreement or statutory authorization exists [to offset wages], 
the employer has the option of recovering overpayments in oth-
er ways such as pursuing a grievance, or bringing a claim 
against the employee.”277 But, the costs of recovery would be 
substantially higher.  
The basic economic theory underlying much of tort law, the 
least-cost avoider principle, justifies allocating the cost of the 
mistake to the employer instead of the employee.278 The least-
cost avoider principle states that the party best able to foresee 
and avoid costs should be liable.279 In the absence of a negotiat-
ed agreement, law often tries to approximate what agreement 
the parties would come to if they had negotiated about a 
term.280 In most employment contracts, the employee does not 
negotiate what will happen in the event of a mistaken over-
payment,281 so this tort principle is applicable.  
 
 274. Roe, supra note 131, at 1667–68. 
 275. In re Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 276. David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 MINN. L. 
REV. 817, 832 (1995). 
 277. Health Emp’rs Ass’n of B.C. v. B.C. Nurses’ Union, 2005 BCCA 343 
¶ 67 (Can.). 
 278. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOM-
IC ANALYSIS 135 (1970). 
 279. Holtz v. J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., 185 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 
1999); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Towards a Test for Strict Liability 
in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972). 
 280. Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 
1147, 1150 (2006). 
 281. Cf. Failinger, supra note 26, at 131 (“Further, the recipient has no 
bargaining power about who will bear the risk if an error occurs, how that er-
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In the context of overpayment, employers are the least-cost 
avoider. The mere fact that the employer is the one making the 
overpayment demonstrates it is the party able to avoid over-
payments, because it has both the ability and opportunity to 
stop them.282 Considering overpayments to be general unse-
cured debts would encourage employers to make payments 
more carefully, because the cost of errors would increase as 
more overpayments would become unrecoverable.283 Under the 
current laws, employers have such powerful collection tools 
that they likely underinvest in ensuring they are paying correct 
wages. Increasing the costs of collection would encourage in-
vestment.  
Of course the counterargument to this point is that the law 
should incentivize employees, not employers, to vigilantly re-
view their paychecks for overpayments. The difficulty with this 
position is that overpayments are often difficult to discover be-
cause of the complexity of compensation schemes. Even busi-
nesses with far superior resources, experience, and incentives 
argue that overpayments from the government are difficult to 
discover.284 Additionally, in many cases, the business has made 
an error because the correct amount of the wage is very compli-
cated to determine. It is difficult to think the employee could 
make the determination more accurately than the business.285 
 
ror will be repaid, or the amount and timing of repayment.”). 
 282. See Levmore, supra note 263, at 74 (explaining the least-cost avoider 
thesis in the context of a creditor/debtor overpayment situation).  
 283. Cf. McGonigle, supra note 26, at 644–45 (“A more compelling argu-
ment can be made that permitting equitable estoppel claims based on gross 
negligence will actually better protect the actuarial soundness of the pension 
fund. Permitting claims based upon gross negligence will incentivize the em-
ployer or pension administrator to take special care in dealing with pensions. 
This, in turn, will ensure that employers and pension administrators are not 
overpaying pensions, thereby protecting the pension fund’s assets.”). 
 284. See Steven J. Chananie et al., Disclosing and Refunding Overpay-
ments in Healthcare Cases, 24 HEALTH LAW. 16, 17 (2012) (“[M]any overpay-
ments can be difficult to quantify and it can take—in some cases—far longer 
than 60 days to do so. Such difficulties may arise, for instance, when a possible 
overpayment is discovered that involves numerous services and bills, each of 
which must be examined to determine whether there was, in fact, an over-
payment or the extent of the overpayment. Such cases may require the review 
of substantial numbers of medical charts and billing records, the hiring of an 
outside consultant, or conducting a review of a statistically valid random sam-
ple and then performing an extrapolation. In such cases, it may be physically 
impossible to complete, or unreasonable to expect completion of, the review 
and quantification of the overpayment within the mandated 60 day time peri-
od.”). 
 285. Cf. Valerius, supra note 63, at 433 (“If accountants specializing in 
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The business usually has superior resources to invest in accu-
racy.  
A second counterargument to this desire to increase the in-
centive for employers investing in accuracy is that it could be 
inefficient for employers to overinvest in accuracy.286 Eric Kades 
gives the example of someone mistakenly paying another per-
son’s electricity bill and then seeking restitution.287 He argues 
for restitution in that scenario: 
[N]ot requiring restitution will lead all bill-payers to take excessive 
precautions when they prepare their bills—such as checking the ac-
count number four times instead of twice. The extra minute spent, 
multiplied by thousands or millions of customers, creates great waste, 
and it likely exceeds the cost of requiring restitution in the few cases 
of mistaken payment.288 
The problem with the overpayment of wages, however, is that 
overpayments are widespread, tilting the scales in favor of 
greater investment. Moreover, in the employment context, the 
business’s investment in accuracy is important to catch under-
payment in favor of the business that the employee may never 
discover. Underpaid employees do not have a self-help remedy 
similar to employers’ self-help remedy for overpayment. If er-
rors are made and employees unjustly enrich employers by 
working more than they compensated for, the employee has to 
go through the process of suing for the difference, although few 
will do so, so the rights are not reciprocal.289 The superior col-
lection rights go one way—against the employee. Thus, it is es-
pecially important for the employers to invest in paying wages 
accurately. 
In light of the policies animating both debtor/creditor law 
and tort law, employers’ mistaken overpayments should be con-
sidered general unsecured debts without a right to offset. This 
meager change would bring employers under the same umbrel-
la of protections as other debtors. 
 
pension payment calculations do not recognize the computation mistake after 
years of overpayment, it is unreasonable to expect retirees to uncover such an 
error.”). 
 286. See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L. J. 1489, 1520 (1999). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Cf. Failinger, supra note 26, at 122 (“[T]he contract model assumes 
that each contractor is able to enforce his rights in case of breach by the other 
party; again, the government as contractor is well aware that few recipients of 
its services will ever challenge its breaches.”). 
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  CONCLUSION   
There is a deep and disturbing variance between how cur-
rent law treats people who take out unsecured debt, like credit 
cards, and employees who are mistakenly overpaid by their 
employers. Moreover, the law contradicts basic intuitions—the 
innocent party that did not agree to the debt and did not know 
about the debt has significantly fewer rights than the party 
who volunteered for the transaction. This Article has un-
masked this disjunction, showing how employers have special 
collection rights and how employees cannot use debt collection 
laws, wage laws, or even bankruptcy effectively to protect 
themselves if they fall into financial distress. 
This inability to find relief in law has serious effects often 
on low-income Americans, such as soldiers. A soldier who is 
overpaid for years because of the Defense Finance and Account-
ing Service’s complicated wage rules and archaic computer sys-
tem can be left scouring food banks and turning to pawnshops 
when her pay is suddenly reduced and debt collectors are call-
ing her. The judicial and legislative solutions I offer would alter 
the relationship between employers and employees when the 
employee is overpaid, bringing that relationship into line with 
the law governing all unsecured credit. Given the frequency of 
mistaken overpayment and their harms, the time has come for 
debtor-creditor law to expand its protection to employees. 
 
